Influence de la négociation intra-ménage sur les dépenses d’éducation dans les ménages au Mali

Keita, Moussa (2011): Influence de la négociation intra-ménage sur les dépenses d’éducation dans les ménages au Mali.

Abstract

The household's consumption expenditures decisions are usually analyzed assuming that household members pool their income (Income Pooling Hypothesis). According to this hypothesis, household’s expenditure pattern is influenced only by the total income and not by the amounts of individual contributions. This means for example that in a couple, the increase in the relative income of one or the other spouse have the same impact on the structure and distribution of household’s expenditures. In this case, the bargaining power associated with the individuals in the household would have no effect on either the structure or the distribution of expenditure within the household. This study is attempting to test this hypothesis by taking the specific case of education expenditures on a sample of 2,412 households in Mali. Our estimations show that women’s intra-household decision power has a significantly different effect from that of man on education expenditures. This result thus calls into question the relevance of the unitary model in analyzing household expenditures choices concerning investment in children human capital.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Influence of intra-household bargaining on education expenditures in households in Mali
• Language: French
• Keywords: Pouvoir de négociation, dépenses d’éducation, modèle unitaire, modèle collectif
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C1 - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General > C12 - Hypothesis Testing: General; D - Microeconomics > D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations

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