Winning virtuous strategy creation by interlocking interconnecting directors in boards of directors in firms in information century

Ledenyov, Dimitri O. and Ledenyov, Viktor O. (2015): Winning virtuous strategy creation by interlocking interconnecting directors in boards of directors in firms in information century.

Abstract

The article presents an original research on 1) the information theory of the board of directors and 2) the strategy creation by the interlocking interconnecting directors in the boards of directors in the firms in an information century. We review the possible structures of the board of directors, and show that there are the interlocking directors networks in the boards of directors in a big number of firms. Researching the strategic governance of firms, we highlight a fact that the director makes the information sensing, filtering, processing, resonant absorption, analysis, decision making, hence it can be empirically represented as a digital signal processor with the Harvard or von Neumann director’s mindset architectures. We think that the board of directors can be theoretically represented as the electronically-scanned electronically-steered phased array radar with a certain number of active antenna elements, filters banks, digital signal processors, memory chipsets in agreement with the digital signal processing and business administration sciences. Using the theoretical assumptions, we formulate the Ledenyov theory on the winning virtuous strategies creation by the interlocking interconnecting directors in the boards of directors in the firms. We suggest that 1) the transmitted information data-stream measurements, 2) the information bit error rate measurements have to be used to accurately characterize the interlocking interlinking interconnecting directors networks in addition to the well known parameters such as the director’s boards seats accumulation number, centrality, Freeman degree, Betweenness. We believe that the positive and negative feedback loops can quite possibly lead to the destructive coordination among the directors by eliminating the randomness element and by introducing the greater uniformity in the pursuing business strategies. We developed the MicroID software program to compute the probability number of the additional directorship mandates issues.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: theory of firm, firm valuation, firm strategy creation, board of directors composition, interlocking directors networks, boards seats accumulation number, centrality, Freeman degree, Betweenness, information flows measurements, destructive coordination, microeconomics, Harvard/von Neumann director’s mindset architectures, digital signal processing, electromagnetic signals absorption, chemical elements absorption, information absorption
• Subjects: G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G30 - General; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G34 - Mergers ; Acquisitions ; Restructuring ; Corporate Governance; M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M1 - Business Administration

References

Economics Science, Finance Science, Economic History Science: 1. Joseph Penso de la Vega 1668, 1996 Confusión de Confusiones re-published by John Wiley and Sons Inc USA.

2. Mortimer Th 1765 Every man his own broker 4th edition London UK.

3. Bagehot W 1873, 1897 Lombard Street: A description of the money market Charles Scribner's Sons New York USA.

4. von Böhm-Bawerk E 1884, 1889, 1921 Capital and interest: History and critique of interest theories, positive theory of capital, further essays on capital and interest Austria; 1890 Macmillan and Co Smart W A (translator) London UK http://files.libertyfund.org/files/284/0188_Bk.pdf .

5. Hirsch M 1896 Economic principles: A manual of political economy The Russkin Press Pty Ltd 123 Latrobe Street Melbourne Australia.

6. Bachelier L 1900 Theorie de la speculation Annales de l’Ecole Normale Superieure Paris France vol 17 pp 21 – 86.

7. Schumpeter J A 1906 Über die mathematische methode der theoretischen ökonomie ZfVSV Austria.

8. Schumpeter J A 1933 The common sense of econometrics Econometrica.

9. Schumpeter J A 1911; 1939, 1961 Theorie der wirtschaftlichen entwicklung; The theory of economic development: An inquiry into profits, capital, credit, interest and the business cycle Redvers Opie (translator) OUP New York USA.

10. Schumpeter J A 1939 Business cycle McGraw-Hill New York USA.

11. Schumpeter J A 1947 The creative response in economic history Journal of Economic History vol 7 pp 149 – 159.

12. Slutsky E E 1910 Theory of marginal utility M Sc Thesis Vernadsky National Library Kiev Ukraine.

13. Slutsky Е Е 1915 Sulla teoria sel bilancio del consumatore Giornale degli economisti e rivista di statistica 51 no 1 pp 1 – 26 Italy.

14. Slutsky E E 1923 On calculation of state revenue from emission of paper money Local Economy 2 pp 39 – 62 Kiev Ukraine.

15. von Mises L 1912 The theory of money and credit Ludwig von Mises Institute Auburn Alabama USA http://mises.org/books/Theory_Money_Credit/Contents.aspx .

16. Morris W (editor) 1913, 1982, 1985 The American heritage dictionary ISBN 0-395-32943-4 pp 1 – 1568.

17. Hayek F 1945 The use of knowledge in society American Economic Review 35 pp 519 – 530.

18. Ellis H, Metzler L (editors) 1949 Readings in the theory of international trade Blakiston Philadelphia USA.

19. Friedman M (editor) 1953 Essays in positive economics Chicago University Press Chicago USA.

20. Baumol W 1957 Speculation, profitability, and stability Review of Economics and Statistics 39 pp 263 – 271.

21. Debreu G 1959 Theory of value Cowles Foundation Monograph vol 17 John Wiley & Sons Inc New York USA.

22. Dodd N 2014 The social life of money Princeton University Press NJ USA ISBN: 9780691141428 pp 1 – 456. Firm Theory Science, Business Administration Science:

23. Babbage Ch 1832 On the economy of machinery and manufacturers Charles Knight 13 Pall Mall East London UK.

24. Ueda 1904 Shogyo Dai Jiten (The dictionary of commerce) Japan.

25. Ueda 1937 Keieikeizaigaku Saran (The science of business administration, Allgemeine Betriebswirtschaftslehre) Japan.

26. Marshall A 1923 Money, credit, and commerce Prometheus Books Amherst New York USA ISBN 13: 9781591020363.

27. Berle A, Means G 1932a The modern corporation and private property The Commerce Clearing House New York USA.

28. Berle A A, Means G 1932b The modern corporation MacMillan New York USA.

29. Ohlin B 1933 Interregional and international trade Harvard University Press Cambridge Massachusetts USA.

30. Coase R H 1937 The nature of the firm Economica vol 4 (16) pp 386 – 405 doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x year=1937.

31. Barnard C I 1938 The functions of the executive Harvard University Press Cambridge MA USA pp 241 – 244.

32. Barnard C I 1948 Organization and management: Selected papers Harvard University Press Cambridge MA USA.

33. Barnard C I 1949 The entrepreneur and formal organization Change and the Entrepreneur. Harvard University Press Cambridge MA USA.

34. Barnard C I 1958 Elementary conditions of business morale California Management Review vol 1 no 1.

35. Solow R M August 1957 Technical changes and the aggregate production function Review of Economics and Statistics 39 pp 214 – 231.

36. Modigliani F, Miller M June 1958 The cost of capital, corporation finance, and the theory of investment American Economic Review pp 261 – 297.

37. Baumol W 1959 Business behaviour, value and growth.

38. Baumol W 1962 The theory of expansion of the firm American Economic Review.

39. Penrose E T 1959 The theory of the growth of the firm Oxford University Press Oxford UK.

40. Marris R May 1963 A model of the managerial enterprise Quarterly Journal of Economics 77 pp 185 – 209.

41. Telser L 1963 Cutthroat competition and the long purse Journal of Law and Economics 9 pp 259 – 277.

42. Williamson O E 1964 The economics of discretionary behavior: Managerial objectives in a theory of the firm Prentice-Hall Englewood Cliffs NJ USA.

43. Williamson O E 1975 Markets and hierarchies: Analysis and antitrust implications Free Press New York USA.

44. Williamson O E 1988 Corporate finance and corporate governance Journal of Finance 43 pp 567 – 591.

45. Cyert R, March J G 1963, 1992 A behavioral theory of the firm Wiley-Blackwell 2nd edition ISBN 0-631-17451-6.

46. Fogel R 1964 Railroads and American economic growth: Essays in econometric history Johns Hopkins Press Baltimore USA.

47. Manne H G 1965 Mergers and the market for corporate control Journal of Political Economy 73-74 pp 110 – 120.

48. Stigler G 1968 The organization of industry Richard Irwin Inc Homewood USA.

49. Mano O 1968-1969 On the science of business administration in Japan Hokudai Economic Papers vol 1 pp 77 – 93 Hokkaido University Japan.

50. Mano O 1970-1971 The development of the science of business administration in Japan since 1955 Hokudai Economic Papers vol 2 pp 30 – 42 Hokkaido University Japan.

51. Mano O 1972-1973 An approach to the organization economy - The development of Barnard's theory Hokudai Economic Papers vol 3 Hokkaido University Japan.

52. Mano O 1975-1976 Social responsibility of the firm-one development of Barnard's theory Hokudai Economic Papers vol 5 Hokkaido University Japan.

53. Mano O 1978 Soshiki Keizai no Kaimei (Organization economy - A study of the management theory of C. L. Barnard) Bunshindo Tokyo Japan.

54. Mano O 1980-1981 Barnard's theory of education for executives Hokudai Economic Papers vol 10 Hokkaido University Japan.

55. Mano O 1987 Barnard no Keiei Riron (Management Theory of C. I. Barnard) Bunshindo Tokyo Japan.

56. Mano O 1994 The Differences between Barnard's and Simon's Concept of Organization Equilibrium-Simon's Misunderstanding about Barnard's Intention Economic Journal of Hokkaido University vol 23 Hokkaido University Japan.

57. Mano O 1995 On the Significance of Lateral Organization In C. I. Barnard's Theory Economic Journal of Hokkaido University vol 24 pp 1 – 13 Hokkaido University Japan.

58. Black F, Scholes M 1973 The pricing of options and corporate liabilities Journal of Political Economy vol 81 pp 637 – 654.

59. Black F, Cox J C 1976 Valuing corporate securities: Some effects of bond indenture provisions Journal of Finance vol 31 pp 351 – 367.

60. Merton R C 1973 Theory of rational option pricing Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science vol 4 pp 141 – 183.

61. Merton R C 1974 On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of interest rates Journal of Finance vol 29 pp 449 – 470.

62. Lee, Jung Hwan 1975 An essay on the theory of the firm vol 2 pp 133 – 153.

63. Jensen M C, Meckling W H 1976 Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure Journal of Financial Economics 3 pp 305 – 360.

64. Jensen M C, Ruback R S 1983 The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence Journal of Financial Economics 11 pp 5 – 50.

65. Jensen M C 1986 Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings of the 98th Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association76 (2) pp 323 – 329.

66. Jensen M C September-October 1989 The eclipse of the public corporation Harvard Business Review 67 (5) pp 61 – 74 http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=146149 .

67. Jensen M C, Murphy K J 1990 Performance pay and top management incentives Journal of Political Economy 98 (2) pp 225 – 264.

68. Jensen M C 1993 The modern industrial revolution: Exit and the failure of internal control systems Journal of Finance 48 (3) pp 831 – 880.

69. Jensen M C 2007 The economic case for private equity Unpublished Harvard NOM Research Paper no 07-02.

70. Fama E 1980 Agency problems and the theory of the firm Journal of Political Economy 88 pp 288 – 307.

71. Fama E, Jensen M 1983 Separation of ownership and control Journal of Law and Economics 26 pp 301 – 325.

72. Fama E, Jensen M 1985 Organizational forms and investment decisions Journal of Financial Economics vol 14 pp 101 – 119.

73. Demsetz H 1983 The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm Journal of Law and Economics vol 26 pp 375 – 390.

74. Demsetz H 1997 Theories of the firm: Their contrasts and implications Chung-Hua Series of Lectures no 25 The Institute of Economics Academia Sinica Nankang Taipei Taiwan Republic of China.

75. Wernerfelt B 1984 A resource-based view of the firm Strategic Management Journal 5 pp 171 – 180.

76. Wernerfelt B 1995 The resource-based view of the firm: Ten years after Strategic Management Journal 16 pp 171 – 174.

77. Lode Li 1986 A stochastic theory of the firm Working Paper no 1844-86 Sloan School of Management MIT USA.

78. Perrow C 1986 Complex organizations Random House New York USA.

79. Hart O, Moore J 1990 Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm Journal of Political Economy vol 98 no 6 pp 1119 – 1158.

80. Hart O 2011 Thinking about the firm: A review of Daniel Spulber’s the theory of the firm Journal of Economic Literature 49 (1) pp 101 – 113 http:www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.49.1.101 .

81. Sterman 2000 Business dynamics McGraw Hill USA.

82. Williamson O E 2002 The Theory of the Firm as Governance Structure: From Choice to Contract Journal of Economic Perspectives vol 16(3) pp 171-195.

83. Gompers P A, Metrick A, Ishii J L 2003 Corporate governance and equity prices Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 pp 107 – 156.

84. Kantarelis D 2007 Theories of the firm Inderscience Genève Switzerland ISBN 0-907776-34-5, ISBN: 0-907776-35-3.

85. Spulber D F 2009 The theory of the firm: Microeconomics with endogenous entrepreneurs, firms, markets, and organizations Cambridge University Press UK http://www.cambridge.org/9780521736602 .

86. Ledenyov D O, Ledenyov V O 2013b On the theory of firm in nonlinear dynamic financial and economic systems Cornell University NY USA www.arxiv.org 1206.4426v2.pdf pp 1 – 27. Board of Directors Science, Interlocking Directors Networks Science, Firms Networks Science, Social Networks Science:

87. Brandeis L D 1915 Annals of the American academy of political and social science vol 57 Proceedings of the Conference of American Mayors on Public Policies as to Municipal Utilities pp 45 – 49.

88. Brandeis L D 1933 Other people’s money-and how the bankers use it Jacket Library Washington National Home Library Foundation USA.

89. Luce R, Perry A 1949 A method of matrix analysis of group structure Psychometrika 14 pp 95 – 116.

90. Selznick P 1949 TVA and the grass roots University of California Press Los Angeles California, Harper & Row New York USA.

91. Selznick P 1957 Leadership in administration Harper & Row New York USA.

92. Ford L R, Fulkerson D R 1956 Maximum flow through a network Canadian Journal of Mathematics 8 pp 399 – 404.

93. Hopkins T K 1964 The exercise of influence in small groups Bedminister Press Totawa New Jersey USA.

94. Milgram S 1967 The small world problem Psychology Today 2 pp 60 – 67.

95. Travers A H 1968 Interlock in corporate management and the antitrust laws Texas Law Review 45 p 819.

96. Vance S C 1968 The corporate director. A critical evaluation Dow-Jones Irvine Homewood Illinois USA.

97. Dooley P C 1969 The interlocking directorate American Economic Review 59 pp 314 – 323.

98. Harary F 1969 Graph theory Addison-Wesley Reading MA USA.

99. Bunting D, Barbour J Autumn 1971 Interlocking directorates in large American corporations, 1896 - 1964 Business History Review 45 (3) pp 317 – 335.

100. Bunting D 1976 Corporate interlocking, part III - Interlocks and return on investment Directors & Boards 1 pp 4 – 11.

101. Mace M L 1971 Directors: Myths and reality Harvard University Press Cambridge Massachusetts USA.

102. Pfeffer J 1972 Size and composition of corporate boards of directors: The organization and its environment Administrative Science Quarterly 17 pp 218 – 228.

103. Pfeffer J 1973 Size, composition, and function of hospital boards of directors: A study of organization-environment linkage Administrative Science Quarterly 18 pp 349 – 364.

104. Pfeffer J 1983 Organizational demography in Research in organizational behavior Cummings L L, Staw B M (editors) JAI Press 5 Greenwich pp 449 – 461.

105. Pfeffer J, Salancik G R 1978 The external control of organizations: A resource-dependency perspective Harper & Row New York USA.

106. Blumberg P 1973 Reflections on proposals for corporate reform through change in the composition of the board of directors: “Special interest” or “Public” directors Boston University Law Review 53 p 547.

107. Bron C, Kerbosch J 1973 Finding all cliques of an undirected graph Communications of the ACM vol 16 pp 575 – 577.

108. Granovetter M 1973 The strength of weak ties American Journal of Sociology 81 pp 1287 – 1303.

109. Doreian P 1974 On the connectivity of social networks Journal of Mathematical Sociology vol 3 pp 245 – 258.

110. Zeitlin M 1974 Corporate ownership and control: The large corporation and the capitalist class American Journal of Sociology 81 pp 894 – 903.

111. Mariolis P 1975 Interlocking directorates and control of corporations: The theory of bank control Social Science Questions 56 pp 425 – 439.

112. Buchmann P 1976 Organisation der Verwaltungsräte in 20 der grössten Aktiengesellschaften in der Schweiz Bern Switzerland, Stuttgart Germany.

113. Burt R S 1976 Position in networks Social Forces vol 55 pp 93 – 122.

114. Burt R S 1983 Corporate profits and cooptation Academic Press New York USA.

115. Cuyvers L, Meeusen W 1976 The structure of personal influence of the Belgian holding companies European Economic Review 8 pp 51 – 69.

116. Cuyvers L, Meeusen W 1985 Financial groups in the Belgian network of interlocking directorships in Networks of corporate power: A comparative analysis of ten countries Stokman F N, Ziegler R, Scott J (editors) Polity Press Oxford UK.

117. Wilson R J 1976 Unlocking interlocks: The on-again off again saga of Section 8 of the Clayton Act Antitrust Law Journal 45 p 317.

118. Hughes M, John S, Mackenzie J 1977 Trends in interlocking directorships: An international comparison Acta Sociologica vol 20 Issue 3 pp 287 – 292.

119. Tukey J W 1977 Exploratory data analysis Addison-Wesley USA.

120. Freeman L 1979a Centrality in social networks: A conceptual clarification Social Networks 1 pp 215 – 239.

121. Freeman L 1979b Visualizing social networks School of Social Sciences University of California Irvine California USA.

122. Koenig T, Gogel R, Sonquist J 1979 Models of the significance of interlocking corporate directorates American Journal of Economics, Sociology 38 pp 173 – 186.

123. Mokken R J 1979 Cliques, clubs and clans Quality and Quantity 13 pp 161 – 173.

124. Burt R S 1980 Cooptive corporate actor networks: A reconsideration of interlocking directorates involving American manufacturing Administrative Science Quarterly 25 pp 557 – 582.

125. Burt R S 1997 The contingent value of social capital Administrative Science Quarterly 42 pp 339 – 365.

126. Pennings J M 1980 Interlocking directorates Jossey-Bass San Francisco California USA.

127. Radcliff R 1980 Banks and corporate lending: An analysis of the impact of the internal structure of the capitalist class on the lending behavior of banks American Sociological Review 45 pp 553 – 570.

128. Mintz B, Schwartz M 1981 Interlocking directorates and interest group formation American Sociological Review 46 (6) pp 851 – 869.

129. Mintz B, Schwartz M 1985 The power structure of American business University of Chicago Press Chicago Illinois USA.

130. Mizruchi M S, Bunting D 1981 Influence in corporate networks: An examination of four measures Administrative Science Quarterly 26 pp 475 – 489.

131. Mizruchi M S 1982 The American corporate network: 1904–1974 Sage Publications Beverly Hills California USA.

132. Stearns L B, Mizruchi M S 1986 Broken-tie reconstitution and the functions of interorganizational interlocks: A reexamination Administrative Science Quarterly 31 pp 522 – 538.

133. Mizruchi M S, Stearns L B 1988 A longitudinal study of the formation of interlocking directorates Administrative Science Quarterly 33 pp 194 – 210.

134. Mizruchi M S 1992 The structure of corporate political action Harvard University Press Cambridge USA.

135. Mizruchi M S, Stearns L B 1994 A longitudinal study of borrowing by large American corporations Administrative Science Quarterly 39 pp 118 – 140.

136. Mizruchi M S 1996 What do interlocks do? An analysis, critique, and assessment of research on interlocking directorates Annual Review of Sociology 22 pp 271 – 298.

137. Byrd D T, Mizruchi M S 2005 Bankers on the board, the debt ratio of firms Journal of Corporate Finance 11 pp 129 – 173.

138. Schoorman F D, Bazerman M H, Atkin R S 1981 Interlocking directorates: A strategy for reducing environmental uncertainty Academy of Management Review 6 pp 243 – 251.

139. Mariolis P, Jones M H 1982 Centrality in corporate interlock networks: Reliability and stability Administrative Science Quarterly 27 pp 571 – 585.

140. Barnes J A 1983 Graph theory in network analysis Social Networks vol 5 pp 235 – 244.

141. Burt R S 1983 Corporate profits and cooptation Academic Press New York USA.

142. Dodd P, Warner J 1983 On corporate governance Journal of Financial Economics 11 pp 401 – 438.

143. Palmer D 1983 Broken ties: Interlocking directorates and inter-corporate coordination Administrative Science Quarterly 28 pp 40 – 55.

144. Roy W 1983 The interlocking directorate structure of the United States American Sociological Review 42 pp 248 – 257.

145. Vance S C 1983 Corporate leadership: Boards, directors, and strategy Mc Graw-Hill New York USA.

146. American Bar Association 1984 Section on Antitrust Law Monograph 10 Interlocking Directorates under Section 8 of Clayton Act. Task force on interlocking directorates Washington USA.

147. American Bar Association 2011 Interlocking directorates Handbook on Section 8 of the Clayton Act Washington USA.

148. Lease R C, McConnell J J, Mikkelson W H 1984 The market value of differential voting rights in closely held corporations Journal of Business vol 57 (4) pp 443 – 467.

149. Ornstein M 1984 Interlocking directorates in Canada: Inter-corporate or class alliance Administrative Science Quarterly 29 pp 210 – 231.

150. Scott J, Griff C 1984 Directors of industry: The British corporate networks 1904–76 Polity Press Cambridge USA.

151. Useem M 1984 The inner circle Oxford University Press New York USA.

152. Wasserman S, Faust K 1994 Social network analysis: Method and application Cambridge University Press Cambridge UK.

153. Ziegler R 1984 Das Netz der Personen- und Kapitalverflechtungen Deutscher und Österreichischer Wirtschaftsunternehmen Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 36 pp 585 – 614.

154. Baysinger R, Butler H 1985 Corporate governance and the board of directors: Performance effects of changes in board composition Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 1 pp 101 – 124.

155. Baysinger B, Hoskisson R E 1990 The composition of boards of directors and strategic control: Effects on corporate strategy Academy of Management Review 15 pp 72 – 87.

156. Bearden J, Mintz B 1985 Regionality and integration in the American interlock network in Networks of corporate power Stokman F N, Ziegler R, Scott J (editors) Polity Press Cambridge UK.

157. Demsetz D, Lehn K 1985 The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and consequences Journal of Political Economy 93-6 pp 1155 – 1177.

158. Galaskiewicz J, Wasserman S, Rauschenbach B, Bielefeld W, Mullaney P 1985 The influence of corporate power, social status, and market position on corporate in a regional network Social Forces 64 (2) pp 401 – 431.

159. Meeusen W, Cuyvers L 1985 The interaction between interlocking directorships, the economic behaviour of companies in Networks of corporate power: A comparative analysis of ten countries Stokman F N, Ziegler R, Scott J (editors) Polity Press Oxford UK.

160. Stokman F N, Wasseur F W 1985 National networks in 1976: A structural comparison in Networks of corporate power: A comparative analysis of ten countries Stokman F N, Ziegler R, Scott J (editors) Polity Press Cambridge UK pp 20 – 44.

161. Stokman F N, van der Knoop J, Wasseur F W 1990 Interlocks in the Netherlands: Stability and careers in the period 1960-1980 in The sociology of elites vol III Interlocking directorships and corporate networks.

162. Mace M 1986 Directors: Myth and reality Harvard Business School Press Boston MA USA.

163. Glatthard A 1987 Unternehmenskonzentration in der Schweiz; Stand und Entwicklung von 1929 bis 1983 Peter Lang Verlag Bern Switzerland.

164. Richardson R J 1987 Directorship interlocks, corporate profitability Administrative Science Quarterly 32 pp 367 – 386.

165. Hermalin B, Weisbach M 1988 The determinants of board composition Rand Journal of Economics 19 pp 589 – 606.

166. Hermalin B, Weisbach M 1998 Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO American Economic Review 88 pp 96 – 118.

167. Hill C W L, Snell S A 1988 External control, corporate strategy, and firm performance in research intensive industries Strategic Management Journal 9 pp 577 – 590.

168. Kesner I F 1988 Directors characteristics and committeeship: An investigation of type, occupation, tenure and gender Academy of Management Journal 30 pp 66 – 84.

169. Zajac E J 1988 Interlocking directorates as an inter-organizational strategy: A test of critical assumptions Academy of Management Journal 31 (2) pp 428 – 438.

170. Zajac E J, Westphal J D 1996 Director reputation, CEO-board power, and the dynamics of board interlocks Administrative Science Quarterly 41 pp 507 – 529.

171. Weisbach M 1988 Outside directorships and CEO turnover Journal of Financial Economics 20 pp 431 – 460.

172. Fosberg R 1989 Outside directors and managerial monitoring Akron Business and Economic Review 20 pp 24 – 32.

173. Lorsch J, MacIver E 1989 Pawns or potentates: The reality of America’s corporate boards Harvard Business School Press Boston MA USA.

174. Nelson R E 1989 The strength of strong ties: Social networks and intergroup conflict in organizations Organization Studies 10 (2) pp 207 – 224.

175. Singh H, Harianto F 1989 Management-board relationships, takeover risk, and the adoption of golden parachutes Academy of Management Journal 32 pp 7 – 24.

176. Zahra S A, Pearce J A 1989 Boards of directors and corporate financial performance: A review and integrative model Journal of Management 15 pp 291 – 344.

177. Gilson S 1990 Bankruptcy, boards, banks, and block-holders: Evidence on changes in corporate ownership and control when firms default Journal of Financial Economics 27 pp 355 – 387.

178. Glaus B U 1990 Unternehmensüberwachung durch schweizerische Verwaltungsräte – Theoretische Grundlagen, rechtliche Anforderungen, Aufgabenwahrnehmung in Wirklichkeit und Gestaltungsempfehlungen Doctoral Dissertation Hochschule St Gallen Switzerland.

179. Kaplan S N, Reishus D 1990 Outside directorships and corporate performance Journal of Financial Economics 27 pp 389 – 410.

180. Kaplan S N, Minton B A 1994 Appointments of outsiders to Japanese boards: Determinants and implications for managers Journal of Financial Economics 36 pp 225 – 258.

181. Powell W 1990 Neither market nor hierarchy: Networks form of organizations Research in Organizational Behavior 12 pp 295 – 336.

182. Rosenstein S, Wyatt J 1990 Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth Journal of Financial Economics 26 pp 175 – 191.

183. Rosenstein S, Wyatt J 1994 Shareholder wealth effects when an officer of one corporation joins the board of directors of another Managerial and Decision Economics 15 pp 317 – 327.

184. Rosenstein S, Wyatt J G 1997 Inside directors, board effectiveness, and shareholder wealth Journal of Financial Economics 44 pp 229 – 250.

185. Burris V 1991 Director interlocks and the political behavior of corporations and corporate elites Social Science Quarterly vol 72 (3) pp 537 – 551.

186. Davis G F 1991 Agents without principles? The spread of the poison pill through the intercorporate network Administrative Science Quarterly vol 36 pp 583 – 613.

187. Davis G F, Greve H R 1997 Corporate elite networks and governance changes in the 1980s American Journal of Sociology 103 pp 1 – 37.

188. Davis G F, Yoo M, Baker W E 2002 The network topography of the American corporate elite 1982-2001 Working Paper Business School University of Michigan USA.

189. Davis G F, Yoo M, Baker W E 2003 The small world of American corporate elite, 1982-2001 Strategic Organization vol 1 (3) pp 301 – 326.

190. Davis G F, Yoo M, Vast E December 2003 Le monde toujours plus petit des grandes entreprises Americaines Gerer et Comprendre.

191. Goodstein J, Boeker W 1991 Turbulence at the top: A new perspective on governance structure changes and strategic change Academy of Management Journal 34 pp 306 – 330.

192. Hermalin B, Weisbach M 1991 The effects of board composition and direct incentives on firm performance Financial Management 20 pp 101 – 112.

193. Hermalin B, Weisbach M 2001 Board of directors as an endogenously determined institution: A survey of the economic literature Working Paper.

194. Byrd J, Hickman k 1992 Do outside directors monitor managers? Evidence from tender offer bids Journal of Financial Economics 32 pp 195 – 221.

195. Demb A, Neubauer F F 1992 The corporate board: Confronting the paradoxes Oxford University Press NY USA.

196. Fligstein N, Brantley P 1992 Bank control, owner control, or organizational dynamics: Who controls the large modern corporation? American Journal of Sociology 98 pp 280 – 307.

197. Gerlach M L 1992 The Japanese corporate network: A blockmodel analysis Administrative Science Quarterly 37 (1) pp 105 – 139.

198. Judge W Q, Zeithaml C P 1992 Institutional and strategic choice perspectives on board involvement in the strategic decision making process Academy of Management Journal 35 pp 766 – 794.

199. Lee C I, Rosenstein S, Rangan N, Davidson lll W N 1992 Board composition and shareholder wealth: The case of management buyouts Financial Management 21 pp 58 – 72.

200. Lincoln J R, Gerlach M L, Takahashi P 1992 Keiretsu networks in the Japanese economy: A dyad analysis of intercorporate ties American Sociological Review 57 pp 561 – 585.

201. Lipton M, Lorsch J 1992 A modest proposal for improved corporate governance Business Lawyer 59 pp 59 – 77.

202. Mallette P, Fowler K L 1992 Effects of board composition and stock ownership of the adoption of “poison pills” Academy of Management Journal 35 pp 1010 – 1035.

203. Milgrom P, Roberts J 1992 Organization and management Prentice Hall NJ USA.

204. Pearce II J A, Zahra S A 1992 Board composition from a strategic contingency perspective Journal of Management Studies 29 pp 411 – 438.

205. Smith C, Watts R 1992 The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies Journal of Financial Economics 32 pp 263 – 292.

206. Daily C M, Dalton D R 1993 Board of directors leadership and structure: Control and performance implications Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice 17 (3) pp 65 – 82.

207. Daily C M, Dalton D R 1994 Bankruptcy and corporate governance: The impact of board composition and structure Academy of Management Journal 37 (6) pp 1603 – 1617.

208. Daily C M, Dalton D R 1997 CEO and board chair roles, held jointly or separately: Much ado about nothing? Academy of Management Executive 11 (3) pp 11 – 20.

209. Dalton D R, Daily C M, Ellstrand A E, Johnson J L 1998 Meta-analytic reviews of board composition, leadership structure, and financial performance Strategic Management Journal 19 pp 269 – 290.

210. Dalton D R, Daily C M, Johnson J L, Ellstrand A E 1999 Number of directors and financial performance: A meta-analysis Academy of Management Journal 42 (6) pp 674 – 686.

211. Jensen M C 1993 The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems Journal of Finance 48 pp 831 – 880.

212. Johnson R A, Hoskisson R E, Hitt M A 1993 Board of directors' involvement in restructuring: The effects of board versus managerial controls and characteristics Strategic Management Journal 14 pp 33 – 50.

213. Haunschild P R 1993 Interorganizational imitation: The impact of interlocks on corporate acquisition activity Administrative Science Quarterly 38 pp 564 – 592.

214. Haunschild P R, Beckman Ch M 1998 When do interlocks matter? Alternate sources of information and interlock influence Administrative Science Quarterly 43 pp 815 – 844.

215. Kester C W 1993 Banks in the boardroom: Germany, Japan and the United States in Financial services: Perspectives and challenges Samuel L Hayess III (editor) Harvard Business School Press Boston Massachusetts USA.

216. Millstein I M 1993 The evolution of the certifying board Business Law 48 p 1485.

217. Shivdasani A 1993 Board composition, ownership structure and hostile takeovers Journal of Accounting and Economics 16 pp 167 – 198.

218. Shivdasani A, Yermack D 1999 CEO involvement in the selection of new board members: An empirical analysis Journal of Finance 54 pp 1829 – 1854.

219. Barnhart S W, Marr M W, Rosenstein S 1994 Firm performance and board composition: Some new evidence Managerial and Decision Economics 15 pp 329 – 340.

220. Brickley J, Coles J, Terry R 1994 Outside directors and the adoption of poison pills Journal of Financial Economics 35 pp 371 – 390.

221. Brickley J, Coles J, Linck J 1999 What happens to CEOs after they retire? New evidence on career concerns, horizon problems, and CEO incentives Journal of Financial Economics 52 pp 341 – 377.

222. Goodstein J, Gautam K, Boeker W 1994 The effects of board size and diversity on strategic change Strategic Management Journal 15 pp 241 – 250.

223. Huse M 1994 Board-management relations in small firms: The paradox of simultaneous indepence and interdepence Small Business Economics 6 pp 55 – 72.

224. Krackhardt D 1994 Graph theoretical dimensions of informal organizations in Computational organization theory Carley K M, Prietula M J (editors) Lawrence Erlbaum Ass Hillsdale USA.

225. Tricker R I 1994 International corporate governance: Text, readings and cases Prentice-Hall Singapore.

226. Wasserman S, Galaskiewicz J 1994 Advances in social network analysis: Research in the social and behavioral sciences Thousand Oaks Sage California USA.

227. Wasserman S, Faust K 1994 Social network analysis Cambridge University Press Cambridge UK.

228. Wasserman S, Faust K, Iacobucci D 1994 Social network analysis: Methods and applications Cambridge University Press Cambridge UK.

229. Benassi M 1995 Governance factors in a network process approach Scandinavian Journal of Management 11 pp 269 – 281.

230. Fligstein N 1995 Networks of power or the finance conception of control? Comment on Palmer, Barber, Zhou, and Soysal American Sociological Review 60 pp 500 – 503.

231. Hallock K January 1995 Executive pay and reciprocal interlocking boards of directors Working Paper no 340 Industrial Relations Section Princeton University USA pp 1 – 57.

232. Hill S 1995 The social organization of boards of directors British Journal of Sociology 46 (2) pp 245 – 278.

233. Kini O, Kracaw W, Mian S 1995 Corporate takeovers, firm performance, and board composition Journal of Corporate Finance 1 pp 383 – 412.

234. Klein A 1995 An examination of board committee structures Working Paper.

235. Lorsch J W January- February 1995 Empowering the boards Harvard Business Review pp 107 – 117.

236. Moerland P W 1995 Alternative disciplinary mechanisms in different corporate systems Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 26 pp 17 – 34.

237. Moerland P W 1997 Corporate governance: Theorie en praktijk in internationaal perspectief Wolters-Noordhoff Groningen The Netherlands.

238. Moerland P W 1999 Corporate supervision in the Netherlands Convergence and Diversity in Corporate Governance Regimes and Capital Markets Conference Tilburg University The Netherlands.

239. Monks R, Minow N 1995 Corporate governance Basil Blackwell Cambridge USA.

240. O'Neal D, Thomas H 1995 Directors networks/director selection: The board's strategic role European Management Journal 13 (1) pp 79 – 90.

241. Pfannschmidt A 1995 Mehrfachmandate in deutschen Unternehmen Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft 65 pp 177 – 203.

242. Wunderer F R 1995 Der Verwaltungsrats-Präsident Ph. D. Dissertation Hochschule St Gallen Schulthess Polygraphischer Verlag Zürich Switzerland.

243. Agrawal A, Knoeber C R 1996 Firm performance and mechanism to control agency problems between managers and shareholders Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 31 pp 377 – 397.

244. Beasley M S 1996 An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud Accounting Review 71 pp 443 – 455.

245. Bhagat S, Black B May 10-11 1996 Do independent directors matter? The American Law and Economics Association Meeting Chicago USA.

246. Bhagat S, Black B 1998 The uncertain relationship between board composition and firm performance Columbia Law School Sloan Project New York USA pp 291 - 316.

247. Bhagat S, Black B 1999 The uncertain relationship between board composition and firm performance Business Law Review vol 54 p 921 – 963.

248. Bhagat S, Black B 2002 The non-correlation between board independence and long-term firm performance Journal of Corporation Law 27 pp 231 – 273.

249. Booth J, Deli D 1996 Factors affecting the number of outside directorships held by CEOs Journal of Financial Economics 40 pp 81 – 104.

250. Booth J, Deli D 1999 On executives of financial institutions as outside directors Journal of Corporate Finance 5 pp 227 – 250.

251. Borokhovich K, Parrino R, Trapani T 1996 Outside directors and CEO selection Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 3 pp 337 – 335.

252. De Cecco M, Ferri G 1996 Le banche d’affari in Italia Il Mulino Bologna Italy.

253. Doz Y 1996 The evolution of cooperation in strategic alliances: Initial conditions or learning processes? Strategic Management Journal 17 pp 55 – 83.

254. Park S, Rozeff M 1996 The role of outside shareholders, outside boards, and management entrenchment in CEO selection Working Paper SUNY Buffalo NY USA.

255. Sundaramurthy C 1996 Corporate governance within the context of antitakeover provisions Strategic Management Journal 17 pp 377 – 394.

256. Sundaramurthy C, Mahoney J M, Mahoney J T 1997 Board structure, antitakeover provisions, and stockholder wealth Strategic Management Journal 18 (3) pp 231 – 245.

257. Yermack D 1996 Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors Journal of Financial Economics 40 pp 185 – 211.

258. West D B 1996 Introduction to graph theory Prentice Hall Upper Saddle River NJ USA.

259. Williamson O E 1996 The mechanisms of governance Oxford University Press New York USA.

260. Bianco M, Pagnoni E 1997 I Legami creati tra le societa quotate dagli interlocking directorates: Il caso delle banche Quaderni di Moneta e Credito Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Italy.

261. Cotter J, Shivdasani A, Zenner M 1997 Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers? Journal of Financial Economics 43 pp 195 – 218.

262. Davies P L, Gower L C B 1997 Gower's principles of company law 6th edition Sweet & Maxwell ISBN-10: 0421524804 ISBN-13: 978-0421524804 pp 1 – 976.

263. Hallock K 1997 Reciprocally interlocking boards of directors and executive compensation Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 32 pp 331 – 344.

264. John K, Senbet L W 1997 Corporate governance and board effectiveness Working Paper New York University NY USA.

265. Loderer C, Martin K 1997 Executive stock ownership and performance: Tracking faint traces Journal of Financial Economics 45 pp 223 – 255.

266. Loderer C, Peyer U September 5 2001, 2002 Board overlap, seat accumulation, and share prices Social Science Research Network USA SSRN-id273465.pdf, European Financial Management 8 pp 165 – 192.

267. Podolny J M, Baron J N 1997 Resources and relationships: Social networks and mobility in the workplace American Sociological Review 62 pp 673 – 693.

268. Rowley T J 1997 Moving beyond dyadic ties: A network theory of stakeholder influences Academy of Management Review issue 22 (4) pp 887 – 910.

269. Rowley T J 1998 Social network analysis in action: Using social network methodologies in stakeholder research Proceedings of the 9th Annual Meeting of the International Association for Business and Society.

270. Elms H, Berman S L, Rowley T J 2000 Network influences on CEO compensation Proceedings for the 11th Annual International Association for Business & Society Vermont USA.

271. Rowley T J, Behrens D, Krackhardt D 2000 Redundant governance structures: An analysis of structural and relational embeddedness in the steel and semiconductor industries Strategic Management Journal 21 pp 369 – 386.

272. Rowley T J June 3, 2005a Invited talk on Canadian directors networks Rotman School of Management Alumni Meeting 2005 Fairmont Royal York Hotel Toronto Canada.

273. Rowley T J June 3, 2005b Private communications on the directors networks in board of directors of North American corporations Rotman School of Management Alumni Meeting 2005 Fairmont Royal York Hotel Toronto Canada.

274. Rowley T J, Baum J 2008 The dynamics of network position Network Strategy (Advances in Strategic Management) vol 24.

275. Shleifer A, Vishny R 1997 A survey of corporate governance Journal of Finance vol 52 pp 737 – 783.

276. Tufano P, Sevick M 1997 Board structure and fee-setting in the US mutual fund industry Journal of Financial Economics 46 pp 321 – 355.

277. Miller G T March 26 1997 Interlocking directorates and the antitrust laws Colorado Lawyer 53.

278. Uzzi B 1997 Social structure and competition in inter-firm networks: The paradox of embeddedness Administrative Science Quarterly 42 pp 35 – 67.

279. Bollobas 1998 Modern graph theory Springer-Verlag New York USA.

280. Charan R 1998 Boards at work: How corporate boards creative competitive advantage Jossey-Bass San Francisco USA.

281. Collin S-O 1998 Why are these islands of conscious power found in the ocean of ownership? Institutional, governance hypotheses explaining the existence of business groups in Sweden Journal of Management Studies 35 pp 719 – 746.

282. Denis D J, Sarin A 1998 Ownership and board structures in publicly traded corporations Working Paper Purdue University France.

283. Eisenberg Th, Sundgren S, Wells M T 1998 Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms Journal of Financial Economics 48 pp 35 – 54.

284. Fried V H, Bruton G D, Hisrich R D 1998 Strategy and the board of directors in venture capital-backed firms Journal of Business Venturing 13 pp 493 – 503.

285. Gulati R 1998 Alliances and networks Strategic Management Journal Special Issue 19 (4) pp 293 – 317.

286. Gulati R, Singh H 1998 The architecture of cooperation: Managing coordination uncertainty and interdependence in strategic alliances Administrative Science Quarterly 43 pp 781 – 814.

287. Gulati R 1999 Network location and learning: The influence of network resources and firm capabilities on alliance formation Strategic Management Journal 20 pp 397 – 420.

288. Gulati R, Garguilo M 1999 Where do networks come from? American Journal of Sociology 104 pp 1439 – 1493.

289. Gulati R, Westphal J D 1999 Cooperative or controlling? The effects of CEO-board relations and the content of interlocks on the formation of joint ventures Administrative Science Quarterly 44 pp 473 – 506.

290. Haunschild P R, Beckman C M 1998 When do interlocks matter? Alternate sources of information and interlock influence Administrative Science Quarterly vol 43 no 4 pp 815 – 844.

291. Hermalin B E, Weisbach M S 1998 Endogenously chosen boards of directors and their monitoring of the CEO American Economic Review vol 88 pp 96 – 118.

292. Hermalin B E, Weisbach M S 2003 Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: A survey of the economic literature Working Paper Series Paper no 3 Centre for Responsible Business University of California Berkeley USA.

293. Hopt K J, Kanada H, Roe M J, Wymeersch E, Prigge S (editors) 1998 Comparative corporate governance - The state of the art and emerging research Clarendon Oxford UK.

294. Hopt K J 1998 The German two-tier board: Experience, theories, reforms in Comparative corporate governance: The state of the art and emerging research Hopt K J (editor) Clarendon USA http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=159555 .

295. Hopt K J, Leyens P C 2004 Board models in Europe – Recent developments of internal corporate governance structures in Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy ECGI Law Working Paper no 18/2004. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=487944 .

296. Hung H 1998 A typology of the theories of the roles of governing boards Corporate Governance: An International Review 6 (2) pp 101 – 111.

297. Everett M G, Borgatti S P 1998 Analyzing clique overlap Connections 21 (1) pp 49 – 61.

298. Khanna T, Gulati R, Nohria N 1998 The dynamics of learning alliances: Competition, cooperation, and relative scope Strategic Management Journal 19 pp 193 – 210.

299. Klein A 1998a Firm productivity and board committee structure Journal of Law and Economics vol 41 pp 137 – 165.

300. Klein A 1998b Affiliated directors: Puppets of management or effective directors Working Paper Stern School of Business New York University NY USA.

301. La Porta R, Lopez de Silanes F, Shleifer A, Vishny R W 1998 Law and finance Journal of Political Economy 106 pp 1113 – 1155.

302. Mac Canna L, Brennan N, O’Higgins 1998 National networks of corporate power: An Irish perspective Journal of Management and Governance vol 2 no 4 pp 357 – 379.

303. Sanders W M G, Carpenter M A 1998 Internationalization and firm governance: The role of CEO compensation, top management team composition, and board structure Academy of Management Journal 41 (2) pp 158 – 178.

304. Spencer S 1998 The Netherlands board index 3rd edition Amsterdam The Netherlands.

305. Stuart T E 1998 Network positions and propensities to collaborate: An investigation of strategic alliance formation in a high-technology industry Administrative Science Quarterly 43 pp 668 – 698.

306. Watts D J, Strogatz S H 1998 Collective dynamics of small-world networks Nature 393 pp 440 – 442.

307. Watts D J 1999 Small worlds Princeton University Press Princeton New Jersey USA.

308. Watts D J 1999 Worlds. The dynamics of networks between order and randomness.

309. Watts D J 1999 Networks, dynamics, and the small world phenomenon American Journal of Sociology 105 pp 493 – 527.

310. Barabasi A, Albert R 1999 Emergence of scaling in random networks Science vol 286 pp 509 – 512.

311. Barabasi A 2002 Linked Perseus Publishing Cambridge MA USA.

312. Borgatti S P, Everett M 1999 Models of core/periphery structures Social Networks 21 pp 375 – 395.

313. Borgatti S P 2002 Basic social network concepts AoM PDW Denver CO USA.

314. Borgatti S P, Everett M G, Freeman L C 2002 Ucinet for Windows: Software for social network analysis Analytic Technologies Harvard MA USA.

315. Borgatti S P, Foster P C 2003 The network paradigm in organizational research: A review and typology Journal of Management 29 (6) pp 991 – 1013.

316. Borgatti S P 2005 Centrality and network flow Social Networks 27 pp 55 – 71.

317. Borgatti S P 2006 Identifying sets of key players in a social network Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory 12 pp 21 – 34.

318. Carroll W K, Malcolm A August 1999 Finance capital and capitalists class integration in the 1990s: Networks of interlocking directorships in Canada and Australia Canadian Review of Sociology & Anthropology vol 36 issue 3 pp 331 – 354.

319. Core J, Holthauser R, Larcker D 1999 Corporate governance, CEO compensation, and firm performance Journal of Financial Economics 51 pp 371 – 406.

320. Davies A 1999 A strategic approach to corporate governance Gower Cambridge UK.

321. Fohlin C 1999 The rise of interlocking directorates in imperial Germany Economic History Review 52 (2) pp 307 – 333.

322. Maassen G F 1999 An international comparison of corporate governance models Ph D dissertation Erasmus University Rotterdam The Netherlands.

323. MacAvoy P S, Millstein M 1999 The active board of directors and its effects on the performance of the large publicly traded corporation Journal of Applied Corporate Finance vol 11 (4) pp 8 – 20.

324. Maman D 1999 Interlocking ties within business groups in Israel – A longitudinal analysis, 1974-1987 Organization Studies 20 pp 323 – 339.

325. Maman D 2001 The organizational connection: Social capital, the career expansion of directors of business groups in Israel Social Science Research 30 pp 578 – 605.

326. Postma Th, van Ees H, Garretsen H, Sterken E 1999 Top management team and board characteristics and firm performance in The Netherlands SOM - Research Report 99 Groningen The Netherlands.

327. Shivdasani A, Yermack D 1999 CEO involvement in the selection of new board members: An empirical analysis Journal of Finance http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~eofek/PhD/papers/SY_CEO_JF.pdf .

328. Vafeas N 1999 Board meeting frequency and firm performance Journal of Financial Economics 53 pp 113 – 142.

329. van Manen J, Hooghiemstra R B H 1999 Supervisory directors in the Netherlands: An expectations gap Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Netherlands Workshop University of Groningen The Netherlands.

330. Adams R B 2000 The dual role of corporate boards as advisors and monitors of management Working Paper Federal Reserve Bank of New York NY USA.

331. Barbi V 2000 Interlocking directorship networks: What is relevant for the evolution and change of the networks? Working Paper no 278 Department of Economics University of Siena Italy http://ssrn.com/abstract=223543 .

332. Blackhurst C 2000 Would Sir care for another directorship? Management Today 5 pp 68 – 71.

333. Dyer J H, Noboeka K 2000 Creating and managing a high performance knowledge-sharing network: The Toyota case Strategic Management Journal 21 PP 345 – 368.

334. Fich E 2000 Do directors who are CEOs of other firms enhance firm performance? UNC Working Paper University of North Carolina NC USA.

335. Gargiulo M, Gulati R January 2000 Where do inter-organizational networks come from? American Journal of Sociology.

336. Gulik E H M, Gedajlovic E R, Maassen G F, Bosch F A J van den, Volberda H W July 8-11 2000 On the service role of boards of directors: Pfeffer (1972) across contexts ASAC-IFSAM Conference Montreal Canada.

337. Kracaw W, Zenner M 2000 Bankers in the boardroom: Good news or bad news? UNC Working Paper.

338. Miwa Y, Ramseyer M 2000 The value of prominent directors: Lessons in corporate governance from transition Japan University of Tokyo, Harvard University Japan, USA.

339. Robert III H M, Evans W J, Honemann D H, Balch Th J October 1 2000 Robert's rules of order newly revised Da Capo Press Cambridge MA USA ISBN 0-7382-0307-6.

340. Scott J 2000 Social network analysis: A handbook 2nd edition Sage Publications London UK.

341. Ward R D 2000 Improving corporate boards John Wiley and Sons Inc Canada.

342. Ferri G, Masciandaro D, Messori M 2001 Corporate governance, board turnover and performance: The case of local banks in Italy Paolo Baffi Centre Working Paper no 01-150 Italy.

343. Ferris S, Jagannathan M 2001 The incidence and determinants of multiple corporate directorships Applied Economics Letters 8 pp 31 – 35.

344. Ferris S, Jagannathan M, Pritchard A 2002 Too busy to mind the business? Monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments Journal of Finance.

345. Ferris S P, Jagannathan M, Pritchard A 2003 Too busy to mind the business? Monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments Journal of Finance vol 58 pp 1087 – 1111.

346. Kroszner R, Strahan P 2001a Throwing good money after bad? Board connections and conflicts in bank lending NBER Working Paper 8694 NBER USA.

347. Kroszner R, Strahan P 2001b Bankers on boards: Monitoring, conflicts of interest, and lender liability Journal of Financial Economics 62 pp 415 – 452.

348. Newman M E J, Strogatz S, Watts D 2001 Random graphs with arbitrary degree distribution and their applications Physical Review 64 pp 1 – 18.

349. Newman M E J 2003 The structure and function of complex networks SIAM Review 45 p 167.

350. Newman M E J 2007 The mathematics of networks in The new Palgrave encyclopedia of economics 2nd edition Blume L E, Durlauf S N (editors) Palgrave Macmillan Basingstoke UK.

351. Okazaki T, Yokoyama K October 2001 Measuring the extent and implications of director interlocking in the pre-war Japanese banking industry Discussion Paper CIRJE-F-138 University of Tokyo Japan pp 1 – 47.

352. Postma Th, van Ees H 2001 On the functions of supervisory boards in the Netherlands Department of Strategic Management Faculty of Management and Organization University of Groningen The Netherlands pp 1 – 28.

353. Snijders T A B 2001 The statistical evaluation of social network dynamics Sociological Methodology 31 (1) p 361.

354. Snijders T A B 2003 Models for longitudinal network data Working Paper.

355. Tomka B 2001 Interlocking directorates between banks and industrial companies in Hungary at the beginning of the twentieth century Business History 43 (1) pp 25 – 42.

356. Bainbridge S M 2002 Why a board? Group decision making in corporate governance Vanderbilt Law Review 55 pp 1 – 55.

357. Becht M, Bolton P, Roell A October 2002 Corporate governance and control www.ssrn.com .

358. Bianchi M, Bianco M, Enriques L 2002 Pyramidal groups and the separation between ownership and control in Italy in The control of corporate Europe Becht M, Barca F (editors) Oxford Scholarship Online Monographs Oxford UK.

359. Bianchi M, Bianco M, Giacomelli S, Pacces A M, Trento S 2005 Proprieta e controllo delle imprese in Italia Il Mulino Bologna Italy.

360. Bianchi M, Bianco M 2006 Italian corporate governance in the last 15 years: From pyramids to coalitions? ECGI - Finance Working Paper no 144/2006 European Corporate Governance Institute.

361. Carver J 2002 Corporate boards that create value: Governing company performance from the boardroom Jossey-Bass USA.

362. Everard A, Henry R 2002 A social network analysis of interlocked directorates in electronic commerce firms Electronic Commerce Research and Applications 1 pp 225 – 234.

363. Faccio M, Lang L H P 2002 The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations in Journal of Financial Economics 65 pp 365 – 395.

364. Perry T, Peyer U C September 2002, August 12 2005 Board seat accumulation by executives: A shareholder’s perspective Working Paper 2002/102/FIN INSEAD Boulevard de Constance 77305 Fontainebleau Cedex France pp 1 – 44, Journal of Finance vol 60 issue 4 pp 2083 – 2123 DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00788.x .

365. Volpin P 2002 Governance with poor investor protection: Evidence from top executive turnover Journal of Financial Economics 64 pp 61 – 90.

366. Dann L Y, Del Guercio D, Partch M 2003 Governance and boards of directors in closed-end investment companies Journal of Financial Economics 69 pp 111 – 148.

367. De B 2003 The incidence, performance effects of interlocking directorates in emerging market business groups: Evidence from India Working Paper Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research India.

368. Fich E M, White L J 2003 CEO compensation and turnover: The effects of mutually interlocked boards Wake Forest Law Review vol 38 pp 935 – 959.

369. Fich E M, White L J 2005 Why do CEOs reciprocally sit on each other’s boards? Journal of Corporate Finance vol 11 pp 175 – 195.

370. Fich E M, Shivdasani A 2006 Are busy boards effective monitors? Journal of Finance vol 61 pp 689 – 724.

371. Gillette A B, Noe T H, Rebello M J 2003 Corporate board composition, protocols, and voting behavior experimental evidence Journal of Finance 58 pp 1997 – 2033.

372. Hermalin B E, Weisbach M S 2003 Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: A survey of the economic literature Economic Policy Review pp 7 – 26.

373. Humphry Hung July 2003 A dual network model of interlocking directorates Asian Academy of Management Journal vol 8 no 2 pp 45 – 66.

374. Malcolm A 2003 Boardroom networks among Australian company directors, 1976 and 1996: The impact of investor capitalism Journal of Sociology vol 39 (3) pp 231 – 251.

375. Ong Ch H, Wan D, Ong K-S October 2003 An exploratory study on interlocking directorates in listed firms in Singapore Corporate Governance: An International Review vol 11 pp 322 – 334 http://ssrn.com/abstract=444344 .

376. Ornstein M 2003 The Canadian corporate network in comparative perspective Comparative Sociology Brill Academic Publishers USA.

377. Phan P H, Lee S H, Lau S C 2003 The performance impact of interlocking directorates: The case of Singapore Journal of Managerial Issues 15 pp 338 – 352.

378. Rodriguez J A, Cardenas J, Oltra C 2003 Networks of economic power in Europe Working Paper.

379. Yeo H-J, Pochet C, Alcouffe A 2003 CEO reciprocal interlocks in French corporations Journal of Management and Governance 7 pp 87 – 108.

380. Bebchuk L A, Cohen A, Ferrell A 2004 What matters in corporate governance Harvard University Olin Discussion Paper no 491.

381. Bebchuk L A, Cohen A 2005 The cost of entrenched boards Journal of Financial Economics 78 pp 409 – 433.

382. Bebchuk L A, Grinstein Y, Peyer U 2006 Lucky CEOs Working Paper 12771 National Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge USA pp 1 – 62 http://www.nber.org/papers/w12771 .

383. Bebchuk L A, Grinstein Y, Peyer U 2006 Lucky directors Working Paper 12811 National Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge USA pp 1 – 54 http://www.nber.org/papers/w12811 .

384. Bebchuk L A, Cremers M, Peyer U 2007 CEO centrality Working Paper 3701 National Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge USA pp 1 – 49 http://www.nber.org/papers/w13701 .

385. Battiston S, Catanzaro M 2004 Statistical properties of corporate board and director networks European Physical Journal B 38 pp 345 – 352.

386. Caldarelli G, Catanzaro M 2004 The corporate boards networks Physica A 338 pp 98 – 106.

387. Hakansson H, Lind J 2004 Accounting and network coordination Accounting, Organizations and Society 29 pp 51 – 72.

388. Heinze T 2004 Dynamics in the German system of corporate governance? Empirical findings regarding interlocking directorates Economy and Society 33 pp 218 – 238.

389. Levine R April 2004 The corporate governance of banks: A concise discussion of concepts and issues in Global Corporate Governance Forum Washington D C USA www.gcgf.org .

390. OECD 2004 Principles of corporate governance OECD www.oecd.org .

391. O’Hagan S B, Green M B 2004 Corporate knowledge transfer via interlocking directorates: A network analysis approach Geoforum 35 pp 127 – 139.

392. Rinaldi A June 25-26 2004 Business elites in Italy: 1913-1972 Business and Society: The 2004 Conference of the Association of Business Historians Nottingham UK.

393. Rinaldi A, Vasta M 2005 The structure of Italian capitalism, 1952-1972: New evidence using the interlocking directorates technique Financial History Review 12 (2) pp 173 – 198.

394. Robins G, Alexander M 2004 Small worlds among interlocking directors: Network structure and distance in bipartite graphs Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory 10 pp 69 – 94.

395. Stablein R, Cleland P, Mackie B, Reid D 2004 New Zealand exchange limited (nzx) boards and directors: It is a small world after all Working Paper.

396. Attig N, Morck R 2005 Boards, corporate governance in a typical country Working Paper University of Alberta Canada.

397. Carrington P J, Scott J, Wasserman S 2005 Models and methods in social network analysis Cambridge University Press Cambridge UK.

398. Chabi S, Maati J 2005 Le petit monde du CAC 40 La revue du financier vol 153 pp 45 – 62.

399. Charan R 2005 Boards that deliver: Advancing corporate governance from compliance to competitive advantage Jossey-Bass USA.

400. De Nooy W, Mrvar A, Batagelj V 2005 Exploratory social network analysis with Pajek Cambridge University Press New York USA.

401. Hanneman R A, Riddle M 2005 Introduction to social network methods University of California Riverside California USA http://faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/ .

402. Pueyo J 2005 Inter- firm relationships and interlocking directorates in Spanish banking in the twentieth century Investigaciones de Historia Económica.

403. Pueyo J 2006 Interlocking directorates in Spanish banking in the twentieth century Dpto de Economia i Empresa Universitat Pompeu Fabra Barcelona Spain pp 1 – 79.

404. Raheja Ch 2005 Determinants of board size and composition: A theory of corporate boards Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 40.

405. Rinaldi A, Vasta M 2005 The structure of Italian capitalism, 1952-1972: New evidence using the interlocking directorates technique Financial History Review 12 p 173.

406. Aguilera R V 2006 National state differences and patterns of directorship interlocks: A comparative study of Italy and Spain http://www.mit.edu/~ecastill/2006seminar/papers/Aguilera2.pdf .

407. Barucci E 2006 Mercato dei capitali e corporate governance in Italia Carocci editore.

408. Batagelj V, Mrvar A 2006 Pajek University of Ljubljana.

409. Bertoni F, Randone P A 2006 The small-world of Italian finance: Ownership interconnections and board interlocks amongst Italian listed companies http://ssrn.com/abstract=917587 .

410. Bizjak J, Lemmon M, Whitby R 2006 Option backdating and board interlocks Working Paper Portland State University, University of Utah USA.

411. Bizjak J, Lemmon M, Whitby R 2009 Option backdating and board interlocks Review of Financial Studies 22 pp 4821 – 4847.

412. Carbonai D, Di Bartolomeo G 2006 Interlocking directorates as a thrust substitute: The case of the Italian non-life insurance industry Department of Communication Working Paper no 1.

413. Chhaochharia V, Grinstein Y 2006a Corporate governance and firm value: The impact of the 2002 governance rules Journal of Finance.

414. Chhaochharia V, Grinstein Y 2006b Executive compensation and board structure Working Paper Cornell University USA.

415. Chhaochharia V, Grinstein Y 2007 Corporate governance and firm value: The impact of the 2002 governance rules Journal of Finance http://faculty.fullerton.edu/jyang/Courses/fin332/Literature/governance%20rule%20result.pdf .

416. Conyon M J, Muldoon M R 2006a The small world of corporate boards in Singapore WSRC paper 2006 3/2 Wharton Pennsylvania USA – SMU Singapore Research Center.

417. Conyon M J, Muldoon M R 2006b The small world of corporate boards Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 33 (9) pp 1321 – 1343.

418. Corrado R, Zollo M 2006 Small worlds evolving: Governance reforms, privatizations, and ownership networks in Italy Industrial and Corporate Change vol 15 no 2 pp 319 – 352 http://ssrn.com/abstract=915137 .

419. Elouaer S 2006 Boardroom networks among French companies: 1996 and 2005.

420. Ferrarini G A 2006 One share - one vote: A European rule? ECGI - Law Working Paper no 58/2006 www.ssrn.com .

421. Guieu G, Meschi P X 2006 Conseils d’Administration et Reseaux d’Administrateurs en Europe (2000-2003): Dynamique et Structure Working Paper.

422. Kiel G C, Nicholson G J 2006 Multiple directorships, corporate performance in Australian listed companies Corporate Governance 14 pp 530 – 546.

423. Kramarz F, Thesmar D January 2006 Social networks in the boardroom IZA Discussion Paper no 1940 http://ssrn.com/abstract=878678 .

424. Morresi O 2006 Performance, proprieta e turnover degli amministratori nel caso Italiano Working Paper Italy.

425. Murgia G 2006 L’impatto dell’interlocking sulle imprese del settore IT del Lazio: Uno studio basato sulla social network analysis Working Paper.

426. Prinz E 2006 Corporate governance and the uncertain role of interlocking directorates Cahier du Fargo no 1061001 Université de Bourgogne – LEG France pp 1 – 26.

427. Silva F, Majluf N, Paredes R D 2006 Family ties, interlocking directorates, performance of business groups in emerging countries: The case of Chile Journal of Business Research 59 pp 315 – 321.

428. Soon Moon Kang May 23 2006 Equi-centrality and network centralization: A micro-macro linkage Netsci Conference.

429. Adams R B, Ferreira D 2007 A theory of friendly boards Journal of Finance 62 pp 217 – 250.

430. Adams R B, Hermalin B E, Weisbach M S 2010 The role of boards of directors in corporate governance: A conceptual framework and survey Journal of Economic Literature 48 pp 58 – 107.

431. Ciocca P 2007 Ricchi per sempre? Una storia economica d'Italia (1796-2005) Bollati Boringhieri Torino Italy.

432. Enriques L, Volpin M Winter 2007 Corporate governance reforms in continental Europe Journal of Economic Perspectives vol 21 no 1 pp 117 – 140.

433. Gerber B M 2007 Enabling interlock benefits while preventing anticompetitive harm: Toward an optimal definition of competitors under section 8 of the Clayton Act Yale Journal on Regulation vol 24 I p 107.

434. Murray A S 2007 Revolt in the boardroom: The new rules of power in corporate America Collins USA.

435. Non M, Franses P H 2007 Interlocking boards and firm performance: Evidence from a new panel database Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper TI 2007-034/2 The Netherlands pp 1 – 35 http://www.tinbergen.nl .

436. Santella P, Drago C, Paone G 2007 Who cares about director independence? SSRN USA http://ssrn.com/abstract=971189 .

437. Santella P, Drago C, Polo A November 11 2007 The Italian chamber of lords sits on listed company boards: An empirical analysis of Italian listed company boards from 1998 to 2006 MPRA Paper no 2265 Munich University Munich Germany pp 1 – 105 http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2265/ , http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1027947 .

438. Santella P, Drago C, Polo A, Gagliardi E 2009 A Comparison among the director networks in the main listed companies in France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom MPRA Paper no 16397 Munich University Germany pp 1 – 19 http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16397/ .

439. Provan K G, Fish A, Sydow J 2007 Interorganizational networks at the network level: A review of the empirical literature on whole networks Journal of Management 33 (3) pp 479 – 516.

440. Rommens A, Cuyvers L, Deloof M November 2007 Interlocking directorates and business groups: Belgian evidence Research Paper 2007-023 Department of Accounting and Finance Faculty of Applied Economics University of Antwerp Belgium pp 1 – 42 http://www.ua.ac.be/tew .

441. Deloof M, Vermoesen V December 2011 The value of bank relationships: Evidence from Belgium at the start of the Great Depression Research Paper 2011-021 Department of Accounting and Finance Faculty of Applied Economics University of Antwerp Belgium pp 1 – 37 http://www.ua.ac.be/tew .

442. Uzzi B, Amaral L A N, Reed-Tsochas F 2007 Small-world networks and management science research: A review European Management Review 4 pp 77 – 91.

443. Bowen W G 2008 The board