Opportunistic politicians and fiscal outcomes: the curious case of Vorarlberg

Köppl Turyna, Monika (2015): Opportunistic politicians and fiscal outcomes: the curious case of Vorarlberg.

Abstract

Using a unique set of electoral rules present in the Austrian state of Vorarlberg, we explore the question whether local electoral rules affect the size of local governments. We find evidence that party--list system is associated with higher levels of expenditure and that direct elections of the mayor are associated with lower size of the public sector. The results are robust to the possibility that electoral rules might be endogenous to the local economic and geographic conditions.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: local expenditure, opportunistic politicians, electoral rules
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior; H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H72 - State and Local Budget and Expenditures; H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H77 - Intergovernmental Relations ; Federalism ; Secession

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