Mathématique et Démocratie : une contribution de la Théorie du Choix Social à la pratique de la démocratie en RDC

Ngoie, Ruffin-Benoît M. and Mbaka, Ruffin M. (2014): Mathématique et Démocratie : une contribution de la Théorie du Choix Social à la pratique de la démocratie en RDC. Published in: Centre de Recherche Interdisciplinaire de l'Université Pédagogique Nationale (CRIDUPN) , Vol. 60, No. 3 (July 2014): pp. 237-249.

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to have in a simple and detailed way the significant results in theory of social choice and to study the resource sharing (goods or responsibilities) between petitioning agents in a proof of election. While analyzing social choice functions more in sight, we present for each of them, with supporting examples, the difficulties and insufficiencies related to the aggregation of the individual preferences of each member of the community. We have then some theoretical results allowing the understanding of the nature and the magnitude of these difficulties. In addition, we study the situation of African societies in general, and that of the Democratic Republic of Congo in particular, and sort out the social choice function which is the most appropriate to them. Meanwhile, we take into account the fair distribution of goods and work for the common benefit of society members, which is the guarantee of welfare of individuals, stability and social peace. These are social values seldom found in Africa. We finally study the properties of the recommended social choice function and possibly present its strength and weaknesses, its advantages and disadvantages when used as a mode of poll.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Mathematics and Democracy: a Social Choice Theory contribution to practicing democracy in DRC.
• Language: French
• Keywords: Aggregation, Elections, Shares, Social choice theory, Social choice function.
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C70 - General; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions

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