Medel, Carlos (2015): Producers, Politicians, Warriors, and Forecasters: Who's Who in the Oil Market? Published in: Nottingham Economic Review , Vol. 15, (March 2015): pp. 28-30.
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Abstract
To what extent geopolitical tensions in major oil-producer countries and unexpected news related to the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) affect oil price? What are the effects of non-market externalities in oil price? Are oil price forecasters aware or affected by such externalities when making their predictions? In this article, I analyse the influence of these events on oil price by means of Granger causality, using an unique measure accounting for these events (2001-12). I found evidence favouring OPEC countries'-related news as an oil price driver, influencing short-term forecasts, and reducing the consensus when unanticipated news are available.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Producers, Politicians, Warriors, and Forecasters: Who's Who in the Oil Market? |
English Title: | Producers, Politicians, Warriors, and Forecasters: Who's Who in the Oil Market? |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Oil-producer countries; OPEC; Oil price; Granger causality |
Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C1 - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General > C12 - Hypothesis Testing: General C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C2 - Single Equation Models ; Single Variables > C22 - Time-Series Models ; Dynamic Quantile Regressions ; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models ; Diffusion Processes E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E66 - General Outlook and Conditions Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q4 - Energy > Q41 - Demand and Supply ; Prices |
Item ID: | 65298 |
Depositing User: | Carlos A. Medel |
Date Deposited: | 26 Jun 2015 11:55 |
Last Modified: | 26 Sep 2019 20:38 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/65298 |