Mavrozacharakis, Emmanouil and Tzagarakis, Stelios (2015): The Greek referendum: an alternative approach.
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Abstract
Admittedly, the balance of power within the European institutions, especially those related to financial stability and economic policy, is controlled by Germany. The German Federal Republic as the "main creditor" controls the Eurogroup, the Euro Working Group and has privileged relations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank (ECB). Due to this fact, Wolfgang Schäuble as the exponent of the hard German economic strategy has a leading role within the European decision-making institutions. France, Italy and other countries are unsuccessfully trying to counteract and mitigate the German influence, as shown by the Greek issue.
This framework is tightly connected with the negotiating ability of any country that inconsistently attempts to reverse the status quo, modify the rules or change the terms of an agreement. The Greek government of Alexis Tsipras sufficiently experienced this suffocating experience and announced a referendum as an attempt to open the field of negotiations.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | The Greek referendum: an alternative approach |
English Title: | The Greek referendum: an alternative approach |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Greece, Populism, SYRIZA, Tsipras, Referendum , EU Crisis, Euro, Eurogroup |
Subjects: | A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics > A10 - General A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics > A11 - Role of Economics ; Role of Economists ; Market for Economists A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics > A12 - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics > A13 - Relation of Economics to Social Values E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E0 - General E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E0 - General > E02 - Institutions and the Macroeconomy G - Financial Economics > G0 - General G - Financial Economics > G0 - General > G01 - Financial Crises H - Public Economics > H1 - Structure and Scope of Government H - Public Economics > H1 - Structure and Scope of Government > H12 - Crisis Management H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H77 - Intergovernmental Relations ; Federalism ; Secession P - Economic Systems > P1 - Capitalist Systems > P11 - Planning, Coordination, and Reform P - Economic Systems > P1 - Capitalist Systems > P16 - Political Economy |
Item ID: | 65738 |
Depositing User: | DR. EMMANOUIL MAVROZACHARAKIS |
Date Deposited: | 23 Jul 2015 09:29 |
Last Modified: | 06 Oct 2019 04:37 |
References: | Mudde, C. & Kaltwasser, C. R. (Eds.) (2012), Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective for Democracy?, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pg. 33-70 Lanza, O. & Lavdas, K. (2000), “The disentanglement of interest politics: Business associability, the parties and policy in Italy and Greece”, European Journal of Political Research 37: 203–235. Here p. 228 Mavrozacharakis, Emmanouil (2015): Das ökonomische und politische Dilemma Europas. MPRA_paper_63323.pdf http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/63323 Mavrozacharakis, Emmanouil (2015, b) , Zum Politischen Machtwechsel in Griechenland. Die Parlamentswahlen von Januar 2015 aus einem kritischen Blickwinkel (On the Political Change in Greece: The Parliamentary Elections in January 2015 in a Critical Perspective) MPRA_paper_62396.pdf http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/62396 Mavrozacharakis, Emmanouil and Tzagkarakis, Stylianos Ioannis and Kamekis, Apostolos ( 2015 c) , Modern Populism in Greece. From Opposition to Power. (April 19, 2015). MPRA_paper_62656.pdf http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/62760/ |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/65738 |