Fair Threats and Promises

Moreno-Okuno, Alejandro (2015): Fair Threats and Promises.

Abstract

In this paper I argue that the concept of Sequential Reciprocity of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) doesn't take correctly into consideration the role of threats and promises and I develop a solution concept of reciprocity which I call Fair Threats Equilibrium, that I believe is better at evaluating the fairness of threats and promises.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Fairness, Threats, Promises, Game Theory
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D0 - General; D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles; D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles

References

Rabin, M. 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," The American Economic Review 83 (5): 1281-1302.

Dufwenberg, M. & Kirchsteiger, G. (2004). "A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity", Games and Economic Behavior 47(2), 268-298.

Engel, Christof (2011) Dictator Games: A Meta Study, Experimental Economics 14, 583-610.

Klein, D. B. & O'flaherty, B. (1993). "A game-theoretic rendering of promises and threats", Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 21, 295-314.

Schelling Thomas C., (1960) The strategy of conflict, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA.

Werner, Gütha and Martin G. Kocherb (2014) "More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature" Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 108, 396--409.