Maurya, Amit Kumar (2015): Multilateral Bargaining with Opt-Out Option.
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Abstract
We study a model of multilateral bargaining in which a buyer attempts to assemble objects owned by multiple sellers. Players can (non-cooperatively) opt out of the bargaining whenever they want. The presence of this option results in an equilibrium in which the buyer implements the project immediately and grabs the entire surplus. It also mitigates the inefficiency associated with nontransparent bargaining protocol. These results are in stark contrast to those obtained in Roy Chowdhury and Sengupta (2012).
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Multilateral Bargaining with Opt-Out Option |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Multilateral bargaining, Opt Out, Outside options, Efficiency, Non-transparency |
Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights |
Item ID: | 68681 |
Depositing User: | Amit Kumar Maurya |
Date Deposited: | 07 Jan 2016 07:19 |
Last Modified: | 28 Sep 2019 12:05 |
References: | [1] Ponsat ́ı, C. and S ́akovics, J. (1998), “Rubinstein Bargaining with Two-Sided Outside Options”, Economic Theory, 11(3), 667-672. [2] Roy Chowdhury, P. and Sengupta, K. (2012), "Transparency, Complementarity and Holdout”, Games and Economic Behavior, 75, 598-612. [3] Rubinstein, A. (1982), “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model”, Econometrica, 50, 97-109. |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/68681 |