Why the traditional principal agent theory may no longer apply to concentrated ownership systems and structures

Ojo, Marianne (2016): Why the traditional principal agent theory may no longer apply to concentrated ownership systems and structures. Published in: Planetary Scientific Research Centre (PSRC) Conference Proceedings (March 2014)

Abstract

This paper not only considers why many concentrated ownership structured systems and jurisdictions are considering a shift to the Anglo American style of corporate governance, but also explores why the traditional principal agency theory model may no longer apply in many concentrated ownership structures.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: principal agent theory; stakeholder theory; informational asymmetries; risk; corporate governance; UK; India; Germany; U.S; Japan
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory; K - Law and Economics > K2 - Regulation and Business Law

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