Prokop, Jacek and Karbowski, Adam (2013): Współpraca badawczo-rozwojowa przedsiębiorstw a kartelizacja gałęzi. Published in: Przegląd Zachodniopomorski No. 28 (September 2013): pp. 259-272.
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Abstract
The main objective of this paper is to investigate the impact of R&D cooperation on cartel formation in the product market. The R&D expenditures that precede the production process are aimed at the reduction of the unit manufacturing costs, and could create positive externalities for the potential competitors. In contrast to the preceding literature, we assume that the competition on the product market follows the Stackelberg leadership model. For simplicity we focus on the case of duopoly. Numerical analysis shows that a closer cooperation at the R&D stage strengthens the incentives to create a cartel in the product market, as well.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Współpraca badawczo-rozwojowa przedsiębiorstw a kartelizacja gałęzi |
English Title: | R&D cooperation of firms and the cartelization of industry |
Language: | Polish |
Keywords: | R&D cooperation of firms, cartelization of industry |
Subjects: | L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L - Industrial Organization > L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies > L41 - Monopolization ; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Innovation ; Research and Development ; Technological Change ; Intellectual Property Rights > O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives |
Item ID: | 73616 |
Depositing User: | A. Karbowski |
Date Deposited: | 11 Sep 2016 11:03 |
Last Modified: | 30 Sep 2019 04:24 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/73616 |