Wu, Haoyang (2016): A costly Bayesian implementable social choice function may not be truthfully implementable.
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Abstract
The revelation principle is a fundamental theorem in many economics fields. In this paper, we construct a simple labor model to show that a social choice function which can be implemented costly in Bayesian Nash equilibrium may not be truthfully implementable. The key point is the strategy cost condition given in Section 4: each agent pays cost when performing strategy in the indirect mechanism, but will not pay the strategy cost in the direct mechanism. As a result, the revelation principle may not hold when agents' strategies are costly in the indirect mechanism.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | A costly Bayesian implementable social choice function may not be truthfully implementable |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Revelation principle; Game theory; Mechanism design; Auction theory |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D70 - General |
Item ID: | 74199 |
Depositing User: | Haoyang Wu |
Date Deposited: | 02 Oct 2016 20:43 |
Last Modified: | 10 Oct 2019 11:15 |
References: | A. Mas-Colell, M.D. Whinston and J.R. Green, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, 1995. A. Kephart and V. Conitzer, The revelation principle for mechanism design with reporting costs, In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), Maastricht, The Netherlands, 2016. J. Green and J.J. Laffont, Partially verifiable information and mechanism design. Review of Economic Studies, vol.53, 447-456, 1986. L. Yu, Mechanism design with partial verification and revelation principle. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, vol.22, 217-223, 2011. V. Auletta, \emph{et al}, Alternatives to truthfulness are hard to recognize. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, vol.22, 200-216, 2011. R.B. Myerson, Multistage games with communication, Econometrica, vol.54, No.2, 323-358, 1986. |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/74199 |
Available Versions of this Item
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A Bayesian implementable social choice function may not be truthfully implementable. (deposited 13 Sep 2016 11:34)
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A Bayesian implementable social choice function may not be truthfully implementable. (deposited 17 Sep 2016 10:40)
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A Bayesian implementable social choice function may not be truthfully implementable. (deposited 19 Sep 2016 09:06)
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A Bayesian implementable social choice function may not be truthfully implementable. (deposited 22 Sep 2016 04:49)
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A costly Bayesian implementable social choice function may not be truthfully implementable. (deposited 24 Sep 2016 11:08)
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A costly Bayesian implementable social choice function may not be truthfully implementable. (deposited 28 Sep 2016 07:26)
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A costly Bayesian implementable social choice function may not be truthfully implementable. (deposited 01 Oct 2016 17:38)
- A costly Bayesian implementable social choice function may not be truthfully implementable. (deposited 02 Oct 2016 20:43) [Currently Displayed]
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A costly Bayesian implementable social choice function may not be truthfully implementable. (deposited 01 Oct 2016 17:38)
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A costly Bayesian implementable social choice function may not be truthfully implementable. (deposited 28 Sep 2016 07:26)
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A costly Bayesian implementable social choice function may not be truthfully implementable. (deposited 24 Sep 2016 11:08)
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A Bayesian implementable social choice function may not be truthfully implementable. (deposited 22 Sep 2016 04:49)
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A Bayesian implementable social choice function may not be truthfully implementable. (deposited 19 Sep 2016 09:06)
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A Bayesian implementable social choice function may not be truthfully implementable. (deposited 17 Sep 2016 10:40)