Marjit, Sugata (2016): Anti-Trade Agitation and Distribution-Neutral Tax Policy- An Elementary Framework.
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Abstract
The recent Brexit episode is being interpreted in some quarters as an anti-globalisation backlash. Free trade does not promise gains for all without a proper compensating mechanism that allows winners to bribe the losers. Also standard prediction of trade theory does point towards increasing wage inequality for the relatively skill abundant developed world. Theoretical discussion on compensating mechanism that addresses inequality is rare in trade literature. In a simple HOS model we consider tax policies that keep the pre-trade degree of inequality unchanged between skilled and unskilled workers. We discuss the problem of existence of such an inequality-neutral tax rate that generates a positive increment in the after tax skilled wage and unskilled wage. Such a mechanism exists and is independent of whether the tax is progressive or proportional.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Anti-Trade Agitation and Distribution-Neutral Tax Policy- An Elementary Framework |
English Title: | Anti-Trade Agitation and Distribution-Neutral Tax Policy- An Elementary Framework |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Trade Model, Wage inequality, Compensation mechanism, Tax policy. |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement F - International Economics > F1 - Trade > F11 - Neoclassical Models of Trade H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H20 - General H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H23 - Externalities ; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs > J31 - Wage Level and Structure ; Wage Differentials |
Item ID: | 74917 |
Depositing User: | sugata marjit |
Date Deposited: | 06 Nov 2016 07:25 |
Last Modified: | 21 Oct 2019 08:28 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/74917 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Anti-Trade Agitation and Distribution-Neutral Tax Policy- An Elementary Framework. (deposited 22 Aug 2016 23:15)
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Anti-Trade Agitation and Distribution-Neutral Tax Policy- An Elementary Framework. (deposited 02 Oct 2016 20:38)
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Anti-Trade Agitation and Distribution-Neutral Tax Policy- An Elementary Framework. (deposited 02 Oct 2016 20:38)