Schilirò, Daniele (2016): Rules, Imbalances and Growth in the Eurozone.
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Abstract
This paper highlights the rules and institutions that have characterized the European Monetary Union during its prolonged crisis and discusses the policies implemented in the Eurozone, stressing the limits of the strategy pursued by the European authorities. It also examines the issues of current account imbalances, economic growth and the problem of debt, and their interconnections. The main purpose of the paper is to indicate some economic solutions and political arrangements in order to complete the institutional system of the EMU. This requires appropriate reforms of its institutional architecture, where a key point is fiscal union. But such reforms require changes in the treaties in order to make the Eurosystem more consistent and endowed of democratic legitimacy, so to have the tools, resources and policies necessary to contribute to the development, stability and cohesion of the Eurozone countries.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Rules, Imbalances and Growth in the Eurozone |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | rules; institutions; current account balance; sovereign debt; growth; Eurozone |
Subjects: | E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E60 - General F - International Economics > F3 - International Finance > F32 - Current Account Adjustment ; Short-Term Capital Movements F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy > F53 - International Agreements and Observance ; International Organizations F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy > F55 - International Institutional Arrangements H - Public Economics > H6 - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt > H63 - Debt ; Debt Management ; Sovereign Debt O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O4 - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity > O43 - Institutions and Growth |
Item ID: | 75641 |
Depositing User: | Daniele Schilirò |
Date Deposited: | 19 Dec 2016 15:20 |
Last Modified: | 01 Oct 2019 03:05 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/75641 |