The Use of Quantitative Economic Techniques in EU Merger Control

Buettner, Thomas and Federico, Giulio and Lorincz, Szabolcs (2016): The Use of Quantitative Economic Techniques in EU Merger Control. Published in: Antitrust Magazine , Vol. 31, No. 1 (December 2016): pp. 68-75.

Abstract

In some recent merger cases the European Commission has relied on quantitative economic techniques in the competitive assessment of horizontal mergers. These techniques have ranged from the use of merger simulation models (for both differentiated and homogenous goods), to the deployment of direct estimation methods to study the effects of relevant events in the past. This article describes the appropriate use of these quantitative techniques, and it explains the rationale for the reliance on these methods. It also explains why the evidence from economic modelling is complementary to more traditional qualitative evidence on the expected impact of horizontal mergers.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: European Commission, merger control, quantitative methods
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C2 - Single Equation Models ; Single Variables > C21 - Cross-Sectional Models ; Spatial Models ; Treatment Effect Models ; Quantile Regressions; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods ; Programming Models ; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C63 - Computational Techniques ; Simulation Modeling; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets; L - Industrial Organization > L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies

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