Central Bank Insolvency: Causes, Effects and Remedies

Bagus, Philipp and Howden, David (2014): Central Bank Insolvency: Causes, Effects and Remedies. Published in: The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies , Vol. 1, No. 39 (2014): pp. 3-23.

Abstract

This article analyzes the possibility and consequences of central bank insolvency. Sovereign insolvency may indirectly cause or aggravate problems leading to central bank insolvency. Sovereigns have a bailout guarantee, either implicitly via loans from major central banks or the IMF, or explicitly, as is the case in the Eurozone via the European Stability Mechanism. Exchange rate stability through these bail-out guarantees allows for a greater amount of foreign-denominated debt accumulation than otherwise would prove prudent, or profitable. In the event of a crisis, the currency mismatch may be problematic for a central bank trying to support its banking system. Lacking the ability to supply foreign currency in the absence of an international bailout, central banks may face insolvency as they try to support an economy indebted in foreign currency.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: central bank insolvency, central bank recapitalization
• Subjects: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E50 - General; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E51 - Money Supply ; Credit ; Money Multipliers; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies

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