Conti, Chiara and Marini, Marco A. (2017): Are You the Right Partner ? R&D Agreement as a Screening Device.
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Abstract
This paper focusseses on the strategic use of firms' R&D agreements to overcome R&D inefficiencies in presence of asymmetric information and research spillovers. We introduce a duopoly game where initially one firm is not fully informed on its rival's R&D productivity. We show that, without R&D agreements, the usual underinvestment problem can be exacerbated by the presence of asymmetric information. However, by proposing a R&D agreement, the uninformed firm may not only gain from the internalization of R&D investment spillovers, but also use it strategically as a screening device to assess the true type of its rival. According to the model, firms are more likely to pursuit R&D agreements in presence of similar productivity and less when their productivity gap is high. This is consistent with the empirical findings highlighting the importance of firms' similarities for R&D collaborations.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Are You the Right Partner ? R&D Agreement as a Screening Device |
English Title: | Are You the Right Partner ? R&D Agreement as a Screening Device |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Asymmetric Information; Screening; Duopoly; R&D investments; R&D Spillovers; R&D agreements. |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design L - Industrial Organization > L0 - General > L00 - General L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L19 - Other |
Item ID: | 80423 |
Depositing User: | Prof Marco Marini |
Date Deposited: | 30 Jul 2017 12:36 |
Last Modified: | 01 Oct 2019 18:02 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/80423 |