Deterrence, Preemption and Panic: A Common-Enemy Problem of Terrorism

Das, Satya P. and Roy Chowdhury, Prabal (2008): Deterrence, Preemption and Panic: A Common-Enemy Problem of Terrorism.

Abstract

We develop a game-theoretic analysis of terrorism that examines the interaction between a terrorist organization and multiple target countries, and considers both pre-emption and deterrence as counter-terrorist policies. The damage from terror includes not only the material cost of fatality, injury and loss of property, but also the resultant fear. The fear-effect leads to different kinds of equilibria and implications for counter-terrorism policies. In particular, the model identifies conditions under which greater pre-emption may be the rational response to an increase in terrorism, i.e., it analyzes the merit of the dictum: ``offense is the best defense.'' Further, it examines the characteristics of cooperative behavior among target countries in dealing with the threat of terrorism.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Subjects: H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H77 - Intergovernmental Relations ; Federalism ; Secession; A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics > A13 - Relation of Economics to Social Values; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games

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