Ansari, Dawud (2017): OPEC, Saudi Arabia, and the Shale Revolution: Insights from Equilibrium Modelling and Oil Politics. Published in: Energy Policy No. 111 (5 September 2017): pp. 166-178.
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Abstract
Why did OPEC not cut oil production in the wake of 2014’s price fall? This study aims at aiding the mostly qualitative discussion with quantitative evidence from computing quarterly partial market equilibria Q4 2011 – Q4 2015 under present short-term profit maximisation and different competition setups. Although the model performs reasonably well in explaining pre-2014 prices, all setups fail to capture low prices, which fall even beyond perfect competition outcomes. This result is robust with respect to large variations in cost parameters. Rejecting present short-term profit maximisation, as well as a qualitative discussion of Saudi Arabian politics and the shale oil revolution, lead to the conclusion that the price drop of 2014-16 was most plausibly the result of an attempt to defend market shares and to test for shale oil resilience, besides being fuelled by other factors such as rising competitiveness of alternative technologies. Although shale oil might have increased competition permanently (as supported by model results), the agreement of December 2016 should not be misunderstood as an OPEC defeat.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | OPEC, Saudi Arabia, and the Shale Revolution: Insights from Equilibrium Modelling and Oil Politics |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Crude oil; OPEC; Shale oil; Oil price; Equilibrium modelling; Saudi Arabia; Shale revolution |
Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods ; Programming Models ; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C61 - Optimization Techniques ; Programming Models ; Dynamic Analysis C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods ; Programming Models ; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C63 - Computational Techniques ; Simulation Modeling L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure ; Size Distribution of Firms L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L - Industrial Organization > L7 - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction > L71 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Hydrocarbon Fuels O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O5 - Economywide Country Studies > O53 - Asia including Middle East Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q3 - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation > Q31 - Demand and Supply ; Prices Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q3 - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation > Q35 - Hydrocarbon Resources |
Item ID: | 82613 |
Depositing User: | Dawud Ansari |
Date Deposited: | 12 Nov 2017 06:30 |
Last Modified: | 28 Sep 2019 08:45 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/82613 |
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OPEC, Saudi Arabia, and the Shale Revolution: Insights from Equilibrium Modelling and Oil Politics. (deposited 21 Apr 2017 08:13)
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