Cryptocurrency Voting Games

Bhattacherjee, Sanjay and Sarkar, Palash (2017): Cryptocurrency Voting Games.

Abstract

This work shows that weighted majority voting games occur in cryptocurrencies. In particular, two such games are highlighted. The first game, which we call the Rule Game, pertains to the scenario where the entities in the system engage in a voting procedure to accept or reject a change of rules. The second game, which we call the Attack Game, refers to the scenario where a group of entities in a cryptocurrency system can form a coalition to engage in double spending. For the Rule Game we provide analysis to argue that the Coleman’s preventive power measure is the appropriate tool for measuring a player’s influence in the game while for the Attack Game, we define a notion of stability based on the notion of minimal winning coalitions. For both the Rule Game and the Attack Game, we show how to analyse the games based on a snapshot of real world data for Bitcoin which is presently the most popular of all the cryptocurrencies.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Voting games, Cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, preventive power, stability
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C1 - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General > C15 - Statistical Simulation Methods: General; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions; Y - Miscellaneous Categories > Y1 - Data: Tables and Charts > Y10 - Data: Tables and Charts; Y - Miscellaneous Categories > Y2 - Introductory Material > Y20 - Introductory Material; Y - Miscellaneous Categories > Y8 - Related Disciplines > Y80 - Related Disciplines

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