Interaction between vertical and horizontal tax competition: evidence and some theory.

Rizzo, Leonzio (2007): Interaction between vertical and horizontal tax competition: evidence and some theory.

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to determine to what extent and how federal taxes affect local tax decisions. Testing the impact of an increase in the federal tax on horizontal tax competition with Canada-US data for 1984--1994, we find evidence that an increase in federal tax affects horizontal tax competition. The novelty of our approach is that it indirectly tests the effect of an increase in federal tax on provincial tax, by testing whether provincial reaction to an increase in neighboring tax changes according to the federal tax level. The test allows for control of yearly macroeconomic shocks by inserting dummies for each year. These are not used in the empirical literature on vertical tax competition because they would cause perfect collinearity with the federal tax.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: horizontal externality; vertical externality; tax competition; tax rate
• Subjects: H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H77 - Intergovernmental Relations ; Federalism ; Secession; H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations; H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H72 - State and Local Budget and Expenditures; H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H71 - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue; H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H73 - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects

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