Piolatto, Amedeo (2008): Publicly provided private goods: education and selective vouchers.
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Abstract
The literature on vouchers often concludes that a vouchers-based system cannot be the outcome of a majority vote. This paper shows that, when the value of vouchers and who is entitled to receive them are fixed exogenously, the majority of voters are in favour of selective vouchers. On top of that, as long as the introduction of vouchers does not undermine the existence of the public school system, introducing selective vouchers induces a Pareto improvement. Middle class agents are the only one using vouchers in equilibrium, while the poorest agents in the economy profit from the reduction in public school congestion.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Publicly provided private goods: education and selective vouchers |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | public economics; education; vouchers; voting |
Subjects: | H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H42 - Publicly Provided Private Goods I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I2 - Education and Research Institutions D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D70 - General |
Item ID: | 8934 |
Depositing User: | Amedeo Piolatto |
Date Deposited: | 04 Jun 2008 04:33 |
Last Modified: | 27 Sep 2019 02:28 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/8934 |
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