Armstrong, Mark and Vickers, John (2008): A model of delegated project choice.
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Abstract
We present a model in which a principal delegates the choice of project to an agent with different preferences. The principal determines the set of projects from which the agent may choose. The principal can verify the characteristics of the project chosen by the agent, but does not know which other projects are available to the agent. Two frameworks are considered: (i) a static setting in which the collection of available projects is exogenous to the agent but uncertain, and (ii) a dynamic setting in which the agent searches for projects.
| Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
|---|---|
| Original Title: | A model of delegated project choice |
| Language: | English |
| Keywords: | Delegation, principal-agent, rules, search, merger policy |
| Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness L - Industrial Organization > L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies |
| Item ID: | 8963 |
| Depositing User: | Mark Armstrong |
| Date Deposited: | 06 Jun 2008 07:28 |
| Last Modified: | 28 Sep 2019 20:16 |
| URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/8963 |
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