Banks Risk Taking and Creditors Bargaining Power

Heller, Yuval and Peleg Lazar, Sharon and Raviv, Alon (2019): Banks Risk Taking and Creditors Bargaining Power.

Abstract

We analyze the influence of unsecured debt (subdebt) on risk-shifting in banks whose assets are risky debt claims. We assume that the stockholders and subdebt-holders jointly decide on risk-shifting. We show that replacing part of the stock with subdebt: (1) leads to fewer risk-shifting events, but can lead to higher levels of risk, depending on the relative bargaining power, (2) does not change the level of risk-shifting when side payments are possible, and (3) may yield the surprising result that risk-shifting increases with tighter regulatory control.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Risk-taking, asset risk, financial institutions, stress test, leverage, bargaining
• Subjects: G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G21 - Banks ; Depository Institutions ; Micro Finance Institutions ; Mortgages; G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G28 - Government Policy and Regulation; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G32 - Financing Policy ; Financial Risk and Risk Management ; Capital and Ownership Structure ; Value of Firms ; Goodwill; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G38 - Government Policy and Regulation

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