Independent Directors’ Tenure, Expropriation, Related Party Transactions, and Firm Value: The Role of Ownership Concentration in Malaysian Publicly Listed Corporations

Liew, Chee Yoong and Devi, S.Susela (2020): Independent Directors’ Tenure, Expropriation, Related Party Transactions, and Firm Value: The Role of Ownership Concentration in Malaysian Publicly Listed Corporations. Published in: Handbook of Research on Accounting and Financial Studies No. Chapter 9 (31 March 2020): pp. 182-207.

Abstract

This chapter analyses the relationship between related party transactions (RPT) and firm value and whether independent directors' tenure (IDT) strengthens or weakens this relationship. Further, it examines ownership concentration's role on this moderating effect of IDT in Malaysian family and non-family corporations. It is found that that IDT weakens the relationship between RPT and firm value. However, ownership concentration strengthens this moderating effect of IDT. Interestingly, family corporations are more likely to show a stronger impact of ownership concentration which we allude to concerns of maintaining reputation. The research results remain after controlling for technology corporations. The findings' have important implications for policy makers, practitioners and regulators, especially in emerging economies globally

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Agency Conflict, Corporate Financial Valuation, Independent Directors' Term in the Office, Corporate Governance, Family Corporations, Emerging Markets
• Subjects: G - Financial Economics > G0 - General; G - Financial Economics > G0 - General > G00 - General; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G30 - General; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G32 - Financing Policy ; Financial Risk and Risk Management ; Capital and Ownership Structure ; Value of Firms ; Goodwill; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G34 - Mergers ; Acquisitions ; Restructuring ; Corporate Governance; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G39 - Other

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