Browse by Authors

2010

Wu, Haoyang (2010): Two examples to break through classical theorems on Nash implementation with two agents.

18 February 2010

Wu, Haoyang (2010): Quantum mechanism helps agents combat Pareto-inefficient social choice rules.

22 April 2010

Wu, Haoyang (2010): A classical algorithm to break through Maskin's theorem for small-scale cases.

10 August 2010

Wu, Haoyang (2010): Bugs in the proofs of revelation principle.

19 August 2010

Wu, Haoyang (2010): Bugs in the proofs of revelation principle.

Wu, Haoyang (2010): A note on revelation principle from an energy perspective.

5 April 2011

Wu, Haoyang (2011): On amending the Maskin's theorem by using complex numbers.

Wu, Haoyang (2011): On amending the Maskin's theorem by using complex numbers.

Wu, Haoyang (2011): Quantum and algorithmic Bayesian mechanisms.

Wu, Haoyang (2011): Two-agent Nash implementation: A new result.

Wu, Haoyang (2011): A non-cooperative Pareto-efficient solution to a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma.

13 April 2011

Wu, Haoyang (2011): Subgame perfect implementation: A new result.

28 April 2011

Wu, Haoyang (2011): Quantum Bayesian implementation.

14 June 2011

Wu, Haoyang (2011): A note on revelation principle from an energy perspective.

3 July 2011

Wu, Haoyang (2011): A novel result on the revenue equivalence theorem.

9 August 2011

Wu, Haoyang (2011): On amending the sufficient conditions for Nash implementation.

6 June 2012

Wu, Haoyang (2012): Traditional sufficient conditions for Nash implementation may fail on Internet.

11 September 2016

Wu, Haoyang (2016): A Bayesian implementable social choice function cannot be implemented by a direct mechanism.

Wu, Haoyang (2016): A costly Bayesian implementable social choice function may not be truthfully implementable.

11 July 2018

Wu, Haoyang (2018): The revelation principle does not always hold when strategies of agents are costly.

25 April 2019

Wu, Haoyang (2019): A note on the definition of Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a mechanism when strategies of agents are costly actions.

1 June 2019

Wu, Haoyang (2019): Profitable Bayesian implementation in one-shot mechanism settings.

8 December 2020

Wu, Haoyang (2020): The revelation principle fails when the format of each agent's strategy is an action.

19 May 2022

Wu, Haoyang (2022): A type-adjustable mechanism where the designer may obtain more payoffs by optimally controlling distributions of agents' types.