Fernandez, Jose and Cataiefe, Guido (2009): Model of the 2000 Presidential Election: Instrumenting for Ideology.
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In a spatial model of voting, a voter's utility for a candidate is a function of ideological distance from the candidate and a candidate's quality. Candidate quality can potentially bias the measure of ideological distance in two ways. First, voters may be more drawn to high quality candidates thereby reducing the ideological distance. Second, a candidate's ideological position is a function of rivals�qualities and his own quality. We derive a theoretical model to sign the direction of both biases analytically. Next, using techniques established in the industrial organization literature, we estimate the model using two sets of instrumental variables.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Model of the 2000 Presidential Election: Instrumenting for Ideology|
|Keywords:||spatial voting, discrete choice, instrumental variables|
|Subjects:||C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C3 - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables > C35 - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
|Depositing User:||Jose Fernandez|
|Date Deposited:||15. Jul 2009 13:34|
|Last Modified:||13. Feb 2013 19:44|
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