Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Lignite price and split of profit negotiation in bilateral monopoly of lignite opencast mine and power plant

Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Lignite price and split of profit negotiation in bilateral monopoly of lignite opencast mine and power plant. Published in: Proceedings of the Fifteenth International Symposium on Mine Planning and Equipment Selection MPES’06 (20. September 2006): pp. 32-37.

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Abstract

The newest outcome of bilateral monopoly (BM) of lignite opencast mine & power plant analysis have been discussed. The determinism of optimal solution maximising joint profits not only in quantity of lignite - the size and shape of the ultimate pit (characteristic to classical solution) but also in its price has been stressed. It is proposed to treat negotiation between power plant and mine as a cooperative, two-stage, two-person, non zero-sum game. In the first stage the ultimate pit maximising joint profits of BM should be chosen and in the second one, during bargaining, the split of profit ought to be decided together with choosing the transfer price of lignite. The level of lignite prices has been presented in the time of their control and confirmation (1996-2003) as well as their new profit sharing role in the period of their freely negotiation. The Nash bargaining solution has been proposed as a tool for equitable split of profit in BM due to its rational conditions. The application of this solution on example from the “Szczerców” deposit has been presented.

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