Un Modelo Principal-Agente Dinámico de Reducción de Perdidas de Energía Electrica en Tiempo Continuo

Zambrano, Juan Carlos and Astaiza-Gómez, José Gabriel and García, Juan David (2021): Un Modelo Principal-Agente Dinámico de Reducción de Perdidas de Energía Electrica en Tiempo Continuo.

Abstract

In this article we analyze the remuneration mechanism for the reduction of energy losses, through a dynamic principal-agent model in continuous time. The agent represents the power distribution company, which makes investments, or in other words, makes an effort to reduce energy losses. The principal represents the regulator, who offers a contract (regulation) to the agent, designed with the purpose of inducing the agent to exert the optimal effort, in the sense that such effort maximizes the expectation of power distribution minus the cost of compensating the agent. In our model, the energy distribution follows a process of diffusion with drift (drift), determined by the effort of the agent, not observable or verifiable by the principal. The optimal contract, carried out on the basis of the continuation value of the agent as a state variable, is calculated from a differential equation.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: A Dynamic Principal-Agent Model of Electric Power Loss Reduction in Continuous Time
• Language: Spanish
• Keywords: Natural Monopoly, Electric Power Losses, Remuneration, Asymmetric Information, Moral Hazard.
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods ; Programming Models ; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C61 - Optimization Techniques ; Programming Models ; Dynamic Analysis; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods ; Programming Models ; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium; D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory; D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D42 - Monopoly; D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D61 - Allocative Efficiency ; Cost-Benefit Analysis; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G32 - Financing Policy ; Financial Risk and Risk Management ; Capital and Ownership Structure ; Value of Firms ; Goodwill; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G35 - Payout Policy; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G38 - Government Policy and Regulation; H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H25 - Business Taxes and Subsidies; H - Public Economics > H3 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents > H32 - Firm; L - Industrial Organization > L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy > L51 - Economics of Regulation; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q4 - Energy > Q41 - Demand and Supply ; Prices

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