Choe, Chongwoo and Yin, Xiangkang (2006): Should executive stock options be abandoned? Published in: Australian Journal of Management , Vol. 31, No. 2 : pp. 163-179.
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Recent corporate scandals around the world have led many to single out executive stock options as one of the main culprits. More corporations are abandoning stock options and reverting to restricted stock. This paper argues that such a change is not entirely justifiable. We first provide a critical review of the pros and cons of executive stock options. We then compare option-based contracts with stock-based contracts using a simple principal-agent model with moral-hazard. In a general environment without restrictions on preferences or technologies, option-based contracts are shown to weakly dominate stock-based contracts. The weak dominance relation becomes strict if the manager is risk neutral. Numerical examples are provided to show that, even if the manager is risk averse, strict dominance is more likely the case.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Should executive stock options be abandoned?|
|Keywords:||EXECUTIVE STOCK OPTIONS; RESTRICTED STOCK; OPTIMAL CONTRACT|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design
G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G30 - General
J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs > J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods
|Depositing User:||Chongwoo Choe|
|Date Deposited:||04. Mar 2009 15:47|
|Last Modified:||08. Mar 2015 05:34|
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