Bouguezzi, Fehmi and EL ELJ, Moez (2009): Vertical Integration and Patent Licensing in Upstream and Downstream Markets.
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The present paper studies and compares different vertical integration structures on consumers and total surplus with licensing by mean of a fixed fee in two successive homogeneous-good Cournot duopolies where one of the firms in each market has a different cost-reducing innovation. The key difference between the present model and models in the existing literature is that here we suppose the existence of two different patents in upstream and downstream markets. In each market we find two firms: the patent holding firm and a non innovative firm. In upstream market, the innovative firm owns an innovation allowing to reduce the input marginal production cost. In downstream market the innovative firm owns an innovation allowing to reduce marginal cost of transforming the input into output. We discuss different structures of vertical integration and we show that consumer surplus and total surplus are depending of cost-reducing innovation in upstream and downstream markets and the structure of vertical integration.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Vertical Integration and Patent Licensing in Upstream and Downstream Markets|
|Keywords:||Cournot successive markets, Fee licensing, Vertical integration, process innovation|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights
O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Innovation ; Research and Development ; Technological Change ; Intellectual Property Rights > O32 - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Innovation ; Research and Development ; Technological Change ; Intellectual Property Rights > O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L24 - Contracting Out ; Joint Ventures ; Technology Licensing
|Depositing User:||Fehmi Bouguezzi|
|Date Deposited:||19. Apr 2010 17:53|
|Last Modified:||20. Feb 2013 03:55|
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