Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część II – Formuły cen węgla brunatnego.

Jurdziak, Leszek (2006): Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część II – Formuły cen węgla brunatnego. Published in: Górnictwo i geologia IX (Mining and geology IX) , Vol. Seria:, No. Prace Naukowe Instytutu Górnictwa Politechniki Wrocławskiej Nr 118 (Scientific Papers of the Institute of Mining of the Wroclaw Univ. of Technology No.118) (23 March 2007): pp. 59-68.

Abstract

For methods of the profit division in the bilateral monopoly of the mine and the power station sug-gested in the first part of this paper the formulae for lignite price and shares in the joint profit of the mine and the power station are calculated. The proposed profit division contain: the egalitarian, normal and asymmetrical Nash solution, the proportional division, assuring equal and proportional profit margins division (in it calculated only on the basis of prime costs) and Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solution with individual utility functions.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Institution: Institute of Mining Engineering at Wroclaw University of Technology
• English Title: Lignite price as a determinant of the split of profit in systems of mines and power plants. Part II – Lignite price formulas.
• Language: Polish
• Keywords: Bilateral monopoly; pit optimisation; bargaining; price negotiation; fair division; Nash bargaining solution; Kalai-Smorodinsky solution; lignite price; lignite mine; lignite power plant; coal mine; coal power plant; coal price
• Subjects: L - Industrial Organization > L0 - General; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory; L - Industrial Organization > L9 - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities > L94 - Electric Utilities; L - Industrial Organization > L7 - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction > L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q3 - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation > Q31 - Demand and Supply ; Prices; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q4 - Energy > Q41 - Demand and Supply ; Prices; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure; D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection; L - Industrial Organization > L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies > L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts; R - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics > R3 - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location > R32 - Other Spatial Production and Pricing Analysis; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L10 - General; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q3 - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation > Q32 - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development; D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D40 - General

References

[1] JURDZIAK L., Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układzie kopalni i elek-trowni. Część I – Propozycje podziału. Górnictwo i Geologia IX. Prace Naukowe Instytutu Górnictwa Politechniki Wrocławskiej Nr 118, Seria: Studia i Materiały: Nr 33, Wrocław 2006. [2] JURDZIAK L., Negocjacje pomiędzy kopalnią węgla brunatnego a elektrownią jako kooperacyjna, dwuetapowa gra dwuosobowa o sumie niezerowej. Energetyka, nr 2/2006. [3] JURDZIAK L., Schemat arbitrażowy Nasha, a podział zysków w bilateralnym monopolu kopalni węgla brunatnego i elektrowni. Cześć pierwsza – podstawy teoretyczne i Cześć druga – zastosowania w negocjacjach strategicznych i taktycznych (złożone w Górnictwie Odkrywkowym w 2006). [4] OWEN G., Teoria gier. PWN Warszawa 1975. [5] STRAFFIN, P.D., Teoria gier. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2004. [6] YOUNG H.PEYTON, Sprawiedliwy podział. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2003.