Rungcharoenkitkul, Phurichai (2005): Coordination failure cycle.
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This paper proposes a theory of endogenous fluctuations, grounded on a repeated game with strategic complementarity under incomplete information. The equilibrium is characterized by a persistent regime of high activity, where aggregate output tends to expand, followed by a persistent contractionary phase in a recurring cycle. The regime persistence is driven by belief hysteresis, where learning in active regime fuels optimism, propelling an expansion. After an inevitable regime switch, rational persistent pessimism ensues, leading to a prolonged contraction. The equilibrium cycle is unique, stochastic, and converges to a stationary distribution, which characterizes the nature of fluctuations in equilibrium.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Coordination failure cycle|
|Keywords:||endogenous cycle, coordination game, learning, global games, hysteresis|
|Subjects:||E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E3 - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles > E32 - Business Fluctuations ; Cycles
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games
|Depositing User:||Phurichai Rungcharoenkitkul|
|Date Deposited:||10 Apr 2012 03:55|
|Last Modified:||26 May 2016 00:54|
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