Kang, Lili and Peng, Fei (2014): Acquisition Premiums of Executive Compensation in China: a Matching View.
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Abstract
More aggressive acquiring firms paid higher executive compensation than non or less aggressive acquiring firms. This paper applies the generalized propensity score (GPS) methodology to estimate the relationship between a firm’s acquisition and its executive compensation. Allowing for continuous treatment, that is, different levels of the firms’ acquisition activities, we apply the GPS method on a panel data set of Chinese Public Listed Companies (PLCs) and find that there is a causal effect of firms’ acquisition activities on executive compensation. However, there is a divergent interests between the board directors and executive managers which may bring serious agency problem in the acquisition decision. The self-selection effect plays a dominant role in the acquisition premiums of top 3 board directors, while the learning-by-acquiring effect on compensation is more prominent for executive managers than board directors. As the executive managers as a whole, can benefit more executive management positions as well as higher growth of executive compensation from aggressive acquisition than board directors and top 3 executive managers.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Acquisition Premiums of Executive Compensation in China: a Matching View |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Acquisition Decision; Executive Compensation; Generalized Propensity Score; Agency problem |
Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C1 - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General > C14 - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G34 - Mergers ; Acquisitions ; Restructuring ; Corporate Governance J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs > J33 - Compensation Packages ; Payment Methods M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M1 - Business Administration > M12 - Personnel Management ; Executives; Executive Compensation |
Item ID: | 55766 |
Depositing User: | Lili Kang |
Date Deposited: | 08 May 2014 13:27 |
Last Modified: | 19 Oct 2019 03:49 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/55766 |