Jellal, Mohamed (2014): Firmes industrielles incitations et formation approche théorique.
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Abstract
This paper provides a theory of rational offer of training policy and efficiency wage by industrial firms. We show that the main determinants of training Policy depends on the level of qualification of workers, the level of control within the firm and its productive structure. The optimal training policy is discontinuous and our model does not exclude the possibility of lack of training policy. Indeed, for a low level of qualification, firms have no incentive to provide training to workers. Finally, the model shows that the profile of the efficiency wage increases with the amount of training , hence our theory is able to explain the positive correlation between high wages and training.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Firmes industrielles incitations et formation approche théorique |
English Title: | Industrial firms incentives and training Policy theoretical approach |
Language: | French |
Keywords: | Efficiency Wage, Training Policy , Human Capital Productivity, Industrial Firms. |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs > J31 - Wage Level and Structure ; Wage Differentials M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M5 - Personnel Economics > M53 - Training M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M5 - Personnel Economics > M54 - Labor Management |
Item ID: | 57306 |
Depositing User: | Mohamed Jellal |
Date Deposited: | 14 Jul 2014 22:53 |
Last Modified: | 26 Sep 2019 15:03 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/57306 |