Rhodes, Andrew and Wilson, Chris M (2015): False Advertising.
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Abstract
There is widespread evidence that some firms use false advertising to overstate the value of their products. Using a model in which a policymaker is able to punish such false claims, we characterize a natural equilibrium in which false advertising actively influences rational buyers. We analyze the effects of policy under different welfare objectives and establish a set of demand and parameter conditions where policy optimally permits a positive level of false advertising. Further analysis considers some wider issues including the implications for product investment and industry self-regulation.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | False Advertising |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Misleading Advertising; Product Quality; Pass-through; Self-Regulation |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L15 - Information and Product Quality ; Standardization and Compatibility M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M3 - Marketing and Advertising > M37 - Advertising |
Item ID: | 68869 |
Depositing User: | Andrew Rhodes |
Date Deposited: | 17 Jan 2016 05:49 |
Last Modified: | 28 Sep 2019 12:28 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/68869 |