Bisceglia, Michele and Cellini, Roberto and Grilli, Luca (2017): Quality competition in healthcare services with regional regulators: A differential game approach.
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Abstract
This article proposes a differential-game model, in order to analyze markets in which regional regulation is operative and competition is based on quality. The case we have in mind is healthcare public service, where consumers (patients) choose the provider mainly basing on the providers' location and the quality of services, while prices play a more limited role. In most European countries, within the same State, regional (or local) providers compete on quality to attract demand. Market regulation is set at national and/or regional level. Our model highlights the features of equilibrium in such a framework, and specifically investigates how the differences in product quality evolve among regions, and how inter-regional demand flows behave. Differently from some available similar models (that do not take into account the regional dimension of the decision process), we find that quality differentials among regions may persist in equilibrium.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Quality competition in healthcare services with regional regulators: A differential game approach |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Healthcare Services; Diffrential Game; Quality Competition;� Regional Regulators. |
Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I1 - Health > I11 - Analysis of Health Care Markets I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I1 - Health > I18 - Government Policy ; Regulation ; Public Health L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets R - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics > R3 - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location > R38 - Government Policy |
Item ID: | 81758 |
Depositing User: | Roberto Cellini |
Date Deposited: | 05 Oct 2017 09:07 |
Last Modified: | 26 Sep 2019 09:23 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/81758 |