The mismatch between potential and actual shirking in a model of bureaucracy

Ciccia, Diego and Distefano, Rosaria and Reito, Francesco (2022): The mismatch between potential and actual shirking in a model of bureaucracy.

Abstract

We present a simple model of bureaucracy under imperfect information, with a public manager and many public officials, some of whom may have the incentive to shirk. We show that the level of shirking in the bureaucracy may be non-monotone in the initial proportion of potential shirkers in the population. Namely, provided the utility from leisure is not too large, the equilibrium level of shirking can be first increasing and then decreasing in the proportion of potential shirkers. A corollary result is that the equilibrium can be efficient only when potential shirkers are particularly numerous.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: bureaucracy; asymmetric information; shirking.
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs > J31 - Wage Level and Structure ; Wage Differentials; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J4 - Particular Labor Markets > J45 - Public Sector Labor Markets

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