Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts

Rosenkranz, Stephanie and Schmitz, Patrick W. (1999): Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts.

Abstract

When two parties invest in human capital and at the same time decide on know-how disclosure it can be shown that joint ownership with veto power is the optimal ownership structure, given that only incomplete contracts can be written.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Incomplete contracts; Know-how disclosure; Joint ownership
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D23 - Organizational Behavior ; Transaction Costs ; Property Rights; O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Innovation ; Research and Development ; Technological Change ; Intellectual Property Rights > O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives; L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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