Analyse de l'impact des coûts de participation sur la stratégie des enchérisseurs dans les Prises de contrôle

Burkart, Mike (2009): Analyse de l'impact des coûts de participation sur la stratégie des enchérisseurs dans les Prises de contrôle.

Abstract

We consider a takeover in which risk neutral bidders must incur participation costs and study their optimal strategy. We found that bidders decision of participation is endogenous. There is a threshold of private participation cost above that a potential bidder will stay out of takeover process. Moreover, when he decides to participate in takeover, his optimal strategy is the submission of his own valuation for the target firm. However, a bidder without initial shareholdings and with low valuation can be completely deterred by the bidder with initial shareholdings. Indeed, a who gets toeholds in the target firm, overbids when he participates in takeover. This can led to an inefficient allocation.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Participation costs and optimal strategy in takeovers
• Language: French
• Keywords: Partipation costs - Initial shareholdings - Private valuation - Overbidding - Takeovers
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D44 - Auctions; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G34 - Mergers ; Acquisitions ; Restructuring ; Corporate Governance; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design

References

BETTON, S. and ECKBO, B. E. (2002). Toeholds, bids-jumps and expected payoffs in takeovers. Review of financial studies, 13, pp 841-882

BETTON, S. and ECKBO, B. E. and THORBURN, K., S. (2005). The toeholds puzzle. Finance working paper N°85

BRADLEY, M. (1980). "Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control." Journal ofsusiness, Vol. 53, pp. 345-376.

BRADLDEY, M., DESAI, A. and KIM, H., E. (1988). Synergistic gains from corporate acquisitions and their division between the stockholders of target and acquiring firms. Journal of Financial Economics 21 pp 3-40

BULOW J., HUANG M. and KLEMPERER P. (1999). Toeholds and Takeovers. Journal of Political Economy, 107, pp. 427-454

BURKART, M. (1995). Initial shareholdings and overbidding in takeover contests. The Journal of Finance. Vol. L, No. 5

CORNU, P. and ISAKOV, D. (2000). The optimal strategy of the initial bidder in takeover contests : Theory and empirical evidence. JEL

ETTINGER, D. (2002). Takeovers, toeholds and deterrence. JEL

FISHMAN, M. (1988). A theory of preemptive takeover bidding. Rand Journal of Economics 19, 88-101

HIRSHLEIFER, D. and TITMAN, S. (1990). Share tendering strategies and the success of hostile takeover bids. The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 2. (Apr., 1990), pp. 295-324.

KRISHNA, V. (2003). Auction Theory.

MILGROM, P. and WEBER, R. (1982). A Theory of auctions and competitive bidding. Econometrica, 50, 1089-1122

SINGH, R. (1998). Takeover bidding with toeholds: The case of the owner's curse, Review of Financial Studies 11, 679--704.