Pedro, de Mendonça (2009): Self-Enforcing Climate Change Treaties: A Generalized Differential Game Approach with Applications.
Preview |
PDF
MPRA_paper_17889.pdf Download (430kB) | Preview |
Abstract
Based on recent proposals on non cooperative dynamic games for analysing climate negotiation outcomes, such as Dutta and Radner (2004, 2006a), we generalize a specific framework for modelling differential games of this type and describe the set of conditions for the existence of closed loop dynamics and its relation to adaptive evolutionary dynamics. We then show that the Dutta and Radner (2004, 2006a) discrete time dynamic setup is a specific case of that generalization and describe the dynamics both analytically and numerically for closed loop feedback and perfect state patterns. Our discussion is completed with the introduction of a cooperative differential framework for welfare analysis purposes, within our non cooperative proposal for climate negotiations.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
---|---|
Original Title: | Self-Enforcing Climate Change Treaties: A Generalized Differential Game Approach with Applications |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Differential Game Theory, Environmental Economics, Evolutionary Dynamics, Climate Change Treaties |
Subjects: | Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics ; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q56 - Environment and Development ; Environment and Trade ; Sustainability ; Environmental Accounts and Accounting ; Environmental Equity ; Population Growth C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods ; Programming Models ; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C61 - Optimization Techniques ; Programming Models ; Dynamic Analysis C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games |
Item ID: | 17889 |
Depositing User: | Gui Pedro de Mendonça |
Date Deposited: | 16 Oct 2009 07:04 |
Last Modified: | 29 Sep 2019 05:01 |
References: | Antoci, Angelo, Gay, Antonio, Landi, Massimiliano, and Sacco, Pier Luigi, “Global analysis of an expectations augmented evolutionary dynamics”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2008, 32, 3877-3894 Basar, Tamer and Olsder, Geert, “Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory”, Mathematics in Science and Engineering, Volume 160, Academic Press, 1982 Brander, James and Taylor, Scott, “The Simple Economics of Easter Island: A Ricardo- Malthus Model of Renewable Resource Use”, American Economic Review, March 1998, 88, No 1, 119-138 Bressan, Alberto, “From Optimal Control to Non-Cooperative Differential Games: a Homotopy Approach”, Department of Mathematics, Penn State University, February, 2009 Breton, Michele, Zacour, Georges and Zahaf, Mehdi, “A differential game of joint implementation of environmental projects”, Automatica, 2005, 41, 1737-1749 Brock, W., Dechert, W., “The Polluted Ecosystem Game”, Indian Growth and Development Review, 2008, 1, No.1, 7-31 Clemens, Christiane and Riechman, Thomas, “Evolutionary Dynamics in Public Good Games”, Computational Economics, 2006, 28, 399-420 Dinda, Soumyananda, “Environmental Kuznets Curve Hypothesis: A Survey”, Ecological Economics, 2004, 48, 431-455 Dreber, Anna and Nowak, Martin, “Gambling for Global Goods”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Science USA, 2009, 106, 4138-4142 Dutta, P. K. and Radner, R., “A game-theoretic approach to global warming”, Advances in Mathematical Economics, 2006a, 8, 135-153 Dutta, P. K. and Radner, R., “Self-Enforcing Climate Change Treaties”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2004, 101, 5174-5179 Dutta, P.K., Radner, R. “Population growth and technological change in a global warming model”, Economic Theory, 2006b, 29, 251-270 Faber, Albert and Frenken, Koen, “Models in evolutionary economics and environmental policy: Towards an evolutionary environmental economics”, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 2009, 76,462-470 Fudenberg, Drew and Tirole, Jean, “Game Theory”, The MIT Press, 1991 Germain, M. and Van Steenberghe, V., “Constraining Equitable Allocations of Tradable CO2 Emission Quotas by Acceptability”, Environmental and Resource Economics, 2003, 26, 469-492 Haurie, Alain, Moresino, Francesco and Viguier, Laurent, “A Two-Level Differential Game of International Emissions Trading”, Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games, Advances in Dynamic Games, 2006, Volume 8 Herbert, Dawid, Deissenber, Cristophe and Sevcik, Pavel, “ Cheap Talk, Gullibility, and Welfare in an Environmental Taxation Game”, Dynamic Games Theory and Applications, Springer, 2005 Hofbauer, Josef and Sigmund, Karl, “Evolutionary Game Dynamics”, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, 2003, 40, No. 4, 479-519 Hofbauer, Josef, Oechssler, Jörg and Riedel, Frank, “Brown–von Neumann–Nash dynamics: The continuous strategy case”, Games and Economic Behaviour, 2009, 65, 406-429 Jean-Marie, Alain and Tidball, Mabel, “Consistent Conjectures, Equilibria and Dynamic Games”, Dynamic Games Theory and Applications, Springer, 2005 Joosten, Reinoud, “Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics: a Unifying Approach”, Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 1996, 6, 313-324 Kossioris, G., Plexousakis, M., Xepapadeas, A., de Zeeuw, A. and Maler, K.-G., “Feedback Nash equilibria for non-linear differential games in pollution control”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, April 2008, 32, No. 4, 1312-1331 Mehlmann, Alexander, “Applied Differential Games”, Plenum Press, 1988 Nordhaus, William and Yang, Zili, “A Regional Dynamic General-Equilibrium Model of Alternative Climate-Change Strategies”, The American Economic Review, September, 1996, 86, No. 4, 741-765 Nowak, Martin, “Evolutionary Dynamics”, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006 Nowak, Martin, et al., “Evolutionary Dynamics of Biological Games”, Science, 2004, 303, 793-799 Petit, Maria Luisa, “Control Theory and Dynamic Games in Economic Policy Analysis”, Cambridge University Press, 1990 Pfeiffer, Thomas and Nowak, Martin, “All in the game”, Nature, June 2006, 441, 583-584 Sandholm, William, “Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics”, New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2008, 2nd edition Sasaki, Tatsuya, Okada, Isamu and Unemi, Tatsuo, “Probabilistic participation in public goods games”, Proceedings of the Royal Society B, 2007, 274, 2639-2642 Smith, John Maynard, “Evolutionary Genetics”, Oxford University Press, 1999, 2nd edition Tidball, Mabel and Zacour, Georges, “A Differential Environmental Game with Coupling Constraints”, Optimal Control Applications and Methods, 2009, 30, 197-207 Viguier, Laurent, Barreto, Leonardo, Haurie, Alain, Kypreos, Socrates and Rafaj Peter, “Modeling endogenous learning and imperfect competition effects in climate change economics”, Climate Change, 2006, 79, 121-141 Weibull, Jorgen, “Evolutionary Game Theory”, The MIT Press, 1995 Yeung, D, “A Class of Differential Games with State-Dependent Closed Loop Feedback Solutions”, Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, July 1989, 62, No. 1, 165-174 |
URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/17889 |