Fiscal policy, institutional quality and central bank transparency

Dai, Meixing and Sidiropoulos, Moïse and Spyromitros, Eleftherios (2010): Fiscal policy, institutional quality and central bank transparency.

Abstract

This paper examines the issues of institutional quality and central bank transparency through the interaction of monetary and fiscal policies. We have found that the effects of transparency and corruption on macroeconomic performance and volatility depend on the relative importance of the marginal supply-side effects of distortionary tax and corruption, the degree of central bank conservativeness and/or the initial degree of opacity about central bank preferences. If the marginal effect of tax is relatively important, more opacity might induce higher level and volatility of inflation when the central bank is sufficiently conservative. Furthermore, opacity and tolerated corruption can mutually reinforce or weaken each other’s effects on the level and volatility of inflation. Transparency is generally a better strategy when the central bank is conservative. However, there could be a case for opacity in order to compensate for the undesirable macroeconomic effects of corruption when the central bank is liberal.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Central bank transparency, central bank conservativeness, fiscal bias, distortionary tax, institutional quality (corruption).
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D73 - Bureaucracy ; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations ; Corruption; H - Public Economics > H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies > H50 - General; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E52 - Monetary Policy; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E63 - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy ; Stabilization ; Treasury Policy; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E61 - Policy Objectives ; Policy Designs and Consistency ; Policy Coordination

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