The necessary and sufficient condition for the transitivity of the Majority Rule in the linear domain

Xefteris, Dimitrios (2010): The necessary and sufficient condition for the transitivity of the Majority Rule in the linear domain.

Abstract

This paper identifies the necessary and sufficient condition for the transitivity of the majority rule when individuals are never indifferent between two distinct alternatives (linear domain). By introducing the concept of the relevant population for each set of alternatives, a unique condition can be stated, and substitute the variety of conditions that already exist in the literature.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: majority rule, transitivity
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D70 - General; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice ; Clubs ; Committees ; Associations

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