Economic models of consumer protection policies

Armstrong, Mark (2011): Economic models of consumer protection policies.

Abstract

This paper summarizes some of my recent work on consumer protection. I present three theoretical models which illustrate the merits and drawbacks of a number of common consumer protection policies, namely: policies which prevent firms from setting unduly high prices; policies which prevent firms requiring on-the-spot decision making by prospective customers, and policies which prevent suppliers from paying commission payments to sales intermediaries.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Consumer protection, consumer search, marketing, commission sales
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics > D18 - Consumer Protection; M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M3 - Marketing and Advertising > M31 - Marketing; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness

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