Unions’ Coordination and the Central Banker’s behavior in a Monetary Union

Borda, Patrie and Gaumont, Damien and Manioc, Olivier (2011): Unions’ Coordination and the Central Banker’s behavior in a Monetary Union.

Abstract

In a 2-country monetary union, this paper studies a Stackelberg game be- tween the Central Banker and two symmetrical countries. The central banker chooses the money supply. In each country, there is a union who acts as a monopoly of labor supply. Firms are wage and price takers. We analyze the effects of internationally coordinated unions versus internationally uncoor-dinated unions. It is shown that wages are lower when unions are interna- tionally coordinated and the money policy is more accomodating. This result is linked to the degree of conservatism of the Central Banker with respect to inflation.1

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Monetary Union, International Union Coodination, Employment and Wage-Setting.
• Subjects: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E52 - Monetary Policy; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J5 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J5 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining > J51 - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects

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