Diszkriminatív áras és egyenáras aukciók

Monostori, Zoltan (2013): Diszkriminatív áras és egyenáras aukciók. Published in: Közgazdasági Szemle , Vol. 10, No. 60 (October 2013): pp. 1048-1074.

Abstract

A tanulmány célja az értékpapírok esetében leggyakrabban alkalmazott két aukciós technika (az egyenáras és a diszkriminatív áras aukció) összehasonlító elemzése. A szakirodalom elsősorban az aukció várható bevétele szempontjából elemzi a módszereket. Az elméleti modellek eltérően rangsorolják a módszerek várható bevételét, viszont jól megmutatják, hogy miként függnek a beadott ajánlatok az aukciós technikától. Ezeket az eredményeket „laboratóriumi” kísérletek és valós aukciók empirikus tapasztalatai is megerősítik. Utóbbiak ráadásul robosztus választ adnak a várható bevétel kérdésére is, mégpedig az egyenáras forma előnyére. Mégis, jelenleg globálisan többségben vannak a diszkriminatív áras módszert használó állampapír-kibocsátók, és a jegybanki eszközöket is többnyire ilyen módszerrel értékesítik. Ez azzal magyarázható, hogy a kibocsátó más szempontokat is figyelembe vehet a várható bevételen kívül.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Discriminatory versus uniform-price auctions
• Language: Hungarian
• Keywords: auction, central bank auctions, treasury auctions, discriminatory auctions, uniform-price auctions
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory; D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D44 - Auctions; D - Microeconomics > D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium > D53 - Financial Markets; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design; H - Public Economics > H6 - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt > H63 - Debt ; Debt Management ; Sovereign Debt

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