Escalating games: how intermediate levels of conflict affect stability of cooperation

Dubovik, Andrei and Parakhonyak, Alexei (2018): Escalating games: how intermediate levels of conflict affect stability of cooperation.

Abstract

We argue that cooperation can become more fragile if (i) there are sufficiently many intermediate levels of cooperation and (ii) players cannot respond with large punishments to small deviations. Such disproportional punishments can be perceived as unreasonable or players can face external constraints---political checks, negative publicity, etc. Specifically, we show that regardless of how patient the players are, any prisoner's dilemma game can be extended with intermediate levels of cooperation in such a way that full conflict is the only equilibrium outcome of the extended game.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: conflict escalation, intermediate levels of conflict, repeated games, prisoners dilemma
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict ; Conflict Resolution ; Alliances ; Revolutions; F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy > F51 - International Conflicts ; Negotiations ; Sanctions

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