A Simple Model of Competitive Testing

Ginzburg, Boris (2019): A Simple Model of Competitive Testing.

Abstract

A number of candidates are competing for a prize. Each candidate is privately informed about his type. The decision-maker who allocates the prize wants to give it to the candidate with the highest type. Each candidate can take a test that reveals his type at a cost. I show that if competition increases, candidates reveal more information when the cost is high, and less information when it is low. Nevertheless, the decision-maker always benefits from greater competition. If competition is large, mandatory disclosure is Pareto-dominated by voluntary disclosure. When the test is noisier, candidates are more likely to take it.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: information disclosure, testing, competition
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; Mechanism Design; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness

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