Dynamic Markets with Randomly Arriving Agents

Said, Maher (2008): Dynamic Markets with Randomly Arriving Agents.

Abstract

We develop a model of a dynamic market with randomly arriving participants. Both buyers and sellers arrive probabilistically over time. The valuation of each buyer for each object is independently distributed and private information to each buyer. Equilibrium prices are determined by a sequence of second-price auctions. We examine the manner in which equilibrium behavior and payoffs are influenced by both current market conditions and anticipated future dynamics.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Dynamic markets, Random arrivals, Endogenous option value, Sequential auctions, Stochastic equivalence
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design > D44 - Auctions; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search ; Learning ; Information and Knowledge ; Communication ; Belief ; Unawareness; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games

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