Harashima, Taiji (2009): Depression as a Nash Equilibrium Consisting of Strategies of Choosing a Pareto Inefficient Transition Path.
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Abstract
This paper shows that a Nash equilibrium consisting of strategies of choosing a Pareto inefficient transition path is selected by households even without frictions as a result of the revealed government failure in supervision of financial markets. The Pareto inefficiency causes the generation of many of the phenomena observed in a depression (e.g., a persistently large amount of unutilized resources), and it is not necessary to use “animal spirits” to explain the generation of a depression. The revealed government failure in the supervision of financial markets and the resulting increased policy-induced uncertainty makes non-cooperative and risk-averse households behave more myopically, resulting in a Nash equilibrium of a Pareto inefficient path. When the failure of financial supervision is revealed, the household rate of time preference shifts upwards when the expected variance of steady-state consumption increases and/or its expected value shifts downwards.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Depression as a Nash Equilibrium Consisting of Strategies of Choosing a Pareto Inefficient Transition Path |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Depression; Pareto efficiency; Nash equilibrium; Time preference; Financial supervision |
Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium > D50 - General E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E3 - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles > E32 - Business Fluctuations ; Cycles E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E2 - Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy > E24 - Employment ; Unemployment ; Wages ; Intergenerational Income Distribution ; Aggregate Human Capital ; Aggregate Labor Productivity D - Microeconomics > D9 - Intertemporal Choice > D91 - Intertemporal Household Choice ; Life Cycle Models and Saving G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G28 - Government Policy and Regulation E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E2 - Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy > E21 - Consumption ; Saving ; Wealth |
Item ID: | 18987 |
Depositing User: | Taiji Harashima |
Date Deposited: | 03 Dec 2009 17:38 |
Last Modified: | 29 Sep 2019 02:03 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/18987 |
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Depression as a Nash Equilibrium Consisting of Strategies of Choosing a Pareto Inefficient Transition Path. (deposited 03 Dec 2009 05:43)
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