Rent-seeking, Government Size and Economic Growth

Wadho, Waqar Ahmed and Ayaz, Umair (2015): Rent-seeking, Government Size and Economic Growth.

Abstract

We explore the relationship between government size and economic growth in an endogenous growth model with human capital and unproductive social capital. We show that with endogenous discounting, growth outcome is history dependent and is function of initial endowment of human capital. With low endowment, government intervention of any size is growth depressing. With high endowment, government intervention is not associated with any depressing effect. For intermediate levels, there are multiple equilibria. Furthermore, countries with identical endowment and government size can be in different equilibrium, and can have different growth rates within same equilibrium if they differ in institutional quality.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Government size, Rent-seeking, Economic Growth, Human capital, Discounting
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior; D - Microeconomics > D9 - Intertemporal Choice > D90 - General; H - Public Economics > H1 - Structure and Scope of Government > H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government; J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J2 - Demand and Supply of Labor > J24 - Human Capital ; Skills ; Occupational Choice ; Labor Productivity; O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O4 - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity > O41 - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models; O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O4 - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity > O43 - Institutions and Growth

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